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Article 6

Justice Blackmun, Abortion, and the
Myth of Medical Independence
Nan D. Hunter †
The social power and magnitude of abortion as a
political issue have long stood in almost comic contrast to the
quiet personality of the author of Roe v. Wade. 1 Justice Harry
A. Blackmun—once described as “the shy person’s justice” 2 —
wrote one of the most dramatic and far-reaching decisions in
American constitutional history. Few other Supreme Court
opinions have so dominated political culture for so long, yet its
author did not come even close to dominating the Court.
Nonetheless, both the fury and the celebration that Roe
engendered have attached themselves indelibly and improbably
to Harry Blackmun.
The most common explanation of how this modest man
came to produce such an immodest decision draws on
Blackmun’s background as resident counsel for the Mayo Clinic
and his admiration of the medical profession.
Justice
Blackmun had wanted to become a doctor; 3 later in life he
became a lawyer for doctors, 4 and he brought to the Court a
deep attitude of protectiveness toward physicians. 5 Passages
in Roe frame the abortion right as one to be shared by doctor
†
Professor of Law and Director, Center for Health, Science and Public
Policy, Brooklyn Law School. I thank Sylvia Law for comments on an earlier draft and
Hilary Bauer, Linda Dougherty, Caitlin Duffy and Terri Rosenblatt for invaluable
research assistance. I am also grateful for the support provided by the Dean’s Summer
Research Stipend program.
1
410 U.S. 113 (1973). In fact, there were two abortion decisions announced
the same day. The companion case was Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In this
article, I will often use what has become the customary shorthand of referring only to
Roe, although many of the points apply to both opinions. When I intend to refer
specifically to Doe, there will be a citation to that case.
2
Laura Kalman, “Becoming Justice Blackmun”: Deconstructing Harry, N.Y.
TIMES, May 8, 2005, § 7, at 9 (book review) (quoting Garrison Keillor).
3
The Justice Harry A. Blackmun Oral History Project: Interviews with
Justice Blackmun, conducted by Professor Harold Hongju Koh, Yale Law School, July
6, 1994-Dec. 13, 1995, at 468-69, available at http://lcweb2.loc.gov/cocoon/blackmunpublic/page.html?FOLDERID=D0901&SERIESID=D09 [hereinafter Oral History].
4
See infra text accompanying notes 40-42.
5
See infra text accompanying notes 56-63.
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and patient 6 and as contingent on medical approval by the
For all these reasons, conventional
treating physician. 7
wisdom has become that Justice Blackmun was a man smitten
with medicine, who wrote Roe to center on the best interests of
physicians. 8
In this article I test this conventional wisdom by
explicitly placing medicine at the center of the analysis of
Justice Blackmun’s opinions on abortion, and then
interrogating the connection between law and medicine. Using
the Blackmun papers opened to the public in 2004 9 and
augmented by other documents and sources, I examine four
critical periods in Blackmun’s life: his years at Mayo; his
participation in a series of medicine-related cases prior to Roe;
the period of intra-Court dynamics in Roe; and the post-Roe
period in which a split developed between Blackmun and Roe’s
critics over the use of medical rhetoric. My first conclusion is

6

As Justice Blackmun wrote in Roe v. Wade:

[F]or the period of pregnancy prior to this “compelling” point, the attending
physician, in consultation with his patient, is free to determine, without
regulation by the State, that, in his medical judgment, the patient’s
pregnancy should be terminated. If that decision is reached, the judgment
may be effectuated by an abortion free of interference by the State.
Roe, 410 U.S. at 163. “The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer
medical treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where
important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention.” Id. at 16566.
7
Continuing from Roe:
For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of
the pregnant woman’s attending physician.
....
. . . The decision vindicates the right of the physician to administer medical
treatment according to his professional judgment up to the points where
important state interests provide compelling justifications for intervention.
Up to those points, the abortion decision in all its aspects is inherently, and
primarily, a medical decision, and basic responsibility for it must rest with
the physician.
Id. at 164-66. See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 183 (1973).
8
Lynne N. Henderson, Legality and Empathy, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1574, 1626
n.333 (1987) (“I hear this repeatedly . . . .” (citing popular impact of BOB WOODWARD &
SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT (1979))); Harold
Hongju Koh, Rebalancing the Medical Triad: Justice Blackmun’s Contributions to Law
and Medicine, 13 AM. J.L. & MED. 315, 320 (1987) (characterizing Roe as reflecting
“Justice Blackmun’s early proclivity to trust too fully in the goodness of doctors”).
9
Linda Greenhouse, Documents Reveal the Evolution of a Justice, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2004, at A1.
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that the long-standing “Mayo made him do it” explanation of
Roe is wrong and should be jettisoned.
Beyond debunking this common claim, I investigate
what effects were produced on the early abortion cases by the
law-medicine relationship. Fuller knowledge of the Court’s
deliberations makes clear that the judicial politics embodied in
Roe can be understood only if it is read as a cobbled together
Blackmun-Brennan-Douglas-Powell decision. More than any
deference to or identification with physicians, the Justices who
decided Roe shared a liberal belief in the value of medical
authority because they assumed it to be a sphere which could
operate independently of the state.
Blackmun was no more naïve than the other Justices in
this respect; perhaps he was less so, given his detailed
knowledge of how interwoven government and medicine were
in the management of a large hospital. 10 His first impulses in
Roe and Doe were to uphold the Georgia abortion statute at
issue in Doe and to declare the Texas law under consideration
in Roe unconstitutional on the limited ground of vagueness. 11
Blackmun’s experiences as counsel for Mayo left him more
pragmatic than starry-eyed about medical authority,
notwithstanding his affection for the institution.
In the years after Roe, one component in the arguments
for its reversal was an attack on the legitimacy of physician
autonomy and authority. 12 The salvaging of Roe in Casey v.
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania 13 derived
not from the strength of medical authority, but from the
reconfiguration of Roe into a decision necessary for the full
The biography of
equality and citizenship of women. 14
Blackmun that Linda Greenhouse crafted from his papers
demonstrates that he too shifted the central basis for his
defense of Roe to an equality frame. 15
This article begins with a narrative of Blackmun’s
experiences at Mayo, when he was on the leading edge of the
10
Blackmun expressed skepticism toward some medical claims as well as
protectiveness. See infra text accompanying notes 112, 118.
11
See infra text accompanying notes 175, 178.
12
See infra text accompanying notes 320-23.
13
505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy and Souter,
JJ.).
14
Id. at 852 (“[T]he liberty of the woman is at stake in a sense unique to the
human condition and so unique to law.”).
15
LINDA GREENHOUSE, BECOMING JUSTICE BLACKMUN: HARRY BLACKMUN’S
SUPREME COURT JOURNEY 222-25 (2005).
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transformation of a legal field centered on the individual
doctor-patient relationship into one of much broader scope,
centered on large, complex health care institutions. Part I
excavates from his papers a richer sense of the nature of his
practice at Mayo. Although Mayo provided Blackmun with
proximity to superior and sometimes exciting medicine, most of
his time was spent on the normal aspects of a corporate
counsel’s job. 16
Part II analyzes Blackmun’s role in cases associated
with medicine that preceded Roe. The pre-Roe cases provide us
with a fuller picture of how Blackmun sought to incorporate
insights from his Mayo experiences into high court
jurisprudence, and reveal the perspectives that Blackmun did
and did not bring to the Court. His papers indicate that he was
concerned about what he feared might be careless treatment of
physicians’ interests, but he was not blind to medical
parochialism nor engaged in a mission to expand the authority
of doctors. The details of this story cumulate into a picture of
Blackmun as a judge whose primary reliance was on his
instincts as a realist.
Part III reconstructs the intra-Court dynamics in Roe. I
argue that Blackmun’s reluctance to issue a broad ruling was
overcome by lobbying by Justices Douglas and Brennan.
Although there are other accounts of the exchanges among
Justices, they have overlooked one factor that is highlighted in
this section: the emphasis on medical authority that Justice
Douglas developed.
It is in Douglas’s writing, not in
Blackmun’s, that one finds arguments for a “right to health.” 17
Other Justices provided the contours for Roe’s
framework. Justice Brennan framed privacy so that it might
include abortion in his opinion in Eisenstadt v. Baird, 18 and
pressed Blackmun in that direction in Roe. 19 Powell, who
joined the Court shortly after Blackmun, became an
unexpected adamant voice for providing maximum leeway to
physicians. 20 In his workmanlike fashion, Blackmun stitched
together the result.
Part IV analyzes the complex role that medical rhetoric
played in post-Roe discourse on the regulation of abortion. For
16
17
18
19
20

See infra text accompanying notes 64-94.
See infra text accompanying notes 232, 235, 239.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
See infra text accompanying notes 160, 179, 258.
See infra text accompanying notes 261.
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Blackmun himself, it offered a vocabulary that he could deploy
in justifying the shift in the political valence of his judicial
philosophy, which itself was a reaction to the attacks on his
abortion opinions. For conservatives on the Court, criticisms of
medical authority as excessive became part of the analytic
structure supporting efforts to diminish the scope of Roe.
Part V argues that beyond any factors particular to
Blackmun, we should read Roe as a cultural text explaining
how late twentieth-century liberals constructed medicine as a
mythically independent, parallel realm to the state. What the
Court sought to do in essence, even if unknowingly, was to
delegate its juridical authority over this procreative question to
physicians. The effort failed. An elite consensus as to the
correctness of professional control split into two competing
paradigms: one, a women’s rights discourse, and the other, a
claim for the sanctity of fetal life. Governance by medical
authority could not in the end withstand the politics of passion
and fear.
I.

HEALTH LAW PRACTICE IN THE 1950S

Harry Blackmun’s admiration of physicians was
certainly real. He “always had a sympathetic attitude toward
the medical profession and for the medical mind.” 21 Justice
Blackmun repeatedly stated that the decade he spent as
general counsel at the Mayo Clinic from 1950 to 1959 was the
happiest period of his professional life. 22 It was a decade in
which “health law” as we know it today—with its focus not
solely on the doctor-patient relationship, but also on large-scale
medical institutions—was just beginning. 23
Blackmun’s experiences at Mayo provide a window into
the nature of health law practice when the field was in its
21
Harry A. Blackmun, Remarks, 15 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 175, 175
(Winter 1987-1988) [hereinafter Blackmun, Remarks].
22
Id.; John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 20, 1983, § 6 (Magazine), at 20; Oral History, supra note 3, at 109. A “Friends of
Mayo” letter, drafted for Blackmun’s signature by the Mayo Department of
Development soon after he retired from the Court, begins: “‘The ten years I spent in
Rochester were the happiest years in my professional life.’ A remarkable statement—
coming as it does from a man who has spent more than two decades on the highest
court in the land.” Draft Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to the Friends of the
Mayo Clinic (Mar. 10, 1994) (on file with the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division,
The Harry A. Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 8 [hereinafter Blackmun Papers]).
23
Barry R. Furrow, From the Doctor to the System: The New Demands of
Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 67, 72 (2004).
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infancy.
When Blackmun began working at Mayo,
practitioners and scholars understood the field as “law and
medicine.” 24 Its primary focus was on liability and regulation
issues directly related to physicians’ provision of care,
including licensure, malpractice, and forensic or courtroom
medicine, such as evidence law. 25 The professional authority
paradigm dominated law and medicine, with its emphasis on
“providing doctors with sweeping control over health care.” 26
The American Academy of Hospital Attorneys did not begin
until nine years after Blackmun left Mayo; the National Health
Lawyers Association formed three years after that. 27
Blackmun’s experiences presaged these developments in
the field, when hospital attorneys became counselors for
complex business transactions, including acquisitions of other
care providers. 28 As hospitals grew in size and importance, the
legal arena expanded to include institutional issues such as
organizational
status,
corporate
tax,
staff-hospital
relationships, institutional liability and licensure, and legal
issues generated by medical discoveries. 29 The field became
more commonly known as “health law” rather than as “law and
medicine,” to signal its broader scope. 30
By the time Justice Blackmun retired from the Supreme
Court in 1994, the conceptualization of health law had changed
significantly. Bioethics and financing issues had mushroomed
into substantial specialties of their own. In Cruzan v. Director,
Missouri Department of Health, 31 the Court entered the debate
24

See generally EMANUEL HAYT ET AL., LAW OF HOSPITAL, PHYSICIAN, AND
PATIENT (2d ed. 1952); ROWLAND H. LONG, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE LAW (1968); John
E. Tracy, Scientific Proof and Relations of Law and Medicine, 41 MICH. L. REV. 872
(1943).
25
Mark A. Hall, The History and Future of Health Care Law: An Essentialist
View, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 347, 348 (2006); Arnold J. Rosoff, Health Law at Fifty
Years: A Look Back, 14 HEALTH MATRIX: J.L.-MED. 197, 198 (2004).
26
Rand E. Rosenblatt, The Four Ages of Health Law, 14 HEALTH MATRIX:
J.L.-MED. 155, 165 (2004).
27
PETER D. JACOBSON, STRANGERS IN THE NIGHT: LAW AND MEDICINE IN THE
MANAGED CARE ERA 49 (2002).
28
One of Blackmun’s major accomplishments while at Mayo was handling
the incorporation and tax issues related to the takeover of the Rochester Methodist
Hospital as a Mayo affiliate. Clark W. Nelson, Historical Profiles of Mayo: Harry A.
Blackmun and Mayo, 74 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 442, 442 (1999). Blackmun’s knowledge of
hospital operations and systems is evident in his opinion in Abbott Laboratories v.
Portland Retail Druggists Ass’n, Inc., 425 U.S. 1, 8-11, 14-17 (1976).
29
JACOBSON, supra note 27, at 50-52, 55-56; Furrow, supra note 23, at 72.
30
Rosoff, supra note 25, at 199-204. The first casebook to use the phrase
“health law” in its title appeared in 1987. Hall, supra note 25, at 352.
31
497 U.S. 261 (1990).

2006]

THE MYTH OF MEDICAL INDEPENDENCE

153

over autonomy issues in death and dying, an area which has
grown and is likely to continue growing. 32 Three federal
statutes enacted between Blackmun’s years at Mayo and when
he joined the Court—Medicare, 33 Medicaid, 34 and ERISA 35 —
revolutionized the financial aspects of health care delivery and
payment.
Examining Justice Blackmun’s Mayo experiences more
closely than has been done before provides ground for caution
in extrapolating their likely effect on his adjudication of
abortion issues. Mayo was a rarefied environment, an elite
institution which presented itself as providing last chance
medical expertise when lesser providers had failed. 36 Although
it is impossible to know about conversations there which may
have touched on abortion, or what Blackmun observed or
absorbed of staff attitudes about the procedure, 37 normal
abortions—those not involving situations of extreme medical
urgency—were not performed at Mayo. 38 As Blackmun himself
put it, “The clinic . . . was not, and did not wish to be, an
abortion mill of any kind . . . .” 39 There is no clear link to the
outcome in Roe from his experiences at Mayo.

32
See Gonzales v. Oregon, ___ U.S. ___, 126 S. Ct. 904, 925 (2006) (holding
that the Controlled Substance Act does not permit the Attorney General to prohibit
doctors from prescribing drugs for use in physician-assisted suicide when the procedure
is allowed under state law); Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, 808-09 (1997) (upholding New
York’s ban on assisted suicide by declining to find a violation of the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728
(1997) (upholding Washington’s ban on assisted suicide by declining to find a
fundamental right to assistance in suicide under the due process clause).
33
Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 426, 13951396d (2000).
34
Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000).
35
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001
(2000).
36
Clinics: The Court of Last Resort, TIME, Oct. 23, 1964, at 96.
37
When asked in his Oral History interview about whether Mayo doctors had
a view as to abortion, Blackmun replied, “Well, if they did, it was certainly not uniform,
and they divided, just as everybody did. As a matter of fact, some of the nastiest letters
I received after Roe against Wade . . . were from Mayo Clinic physicians. Nearly all of
them approved of Roe against Wade, but not all of them by any means.” Oral History,
supra note 3, at 192.
38
See infra text accompanying notes 52-55.
39
Oral History, supra note 3, at 192.
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Justice Blackmun’s Connections with Physicians at the
Mayo Clinic

Blackmun began representing the Mayo Clinic and
some of its physicians in the 1940s, while he was an associate
at a Minneapolis firm. 40 He attributed Mayo’s interest in
hiring him as its first resident counsel to a managerial
realization that continuing to have only a local firm lawyer was
insufficient. The administrative head of Mayo “sensed a
changing political situation, changing legal situation and
thought that maybe the Mayos should have representation by a
larger firm that had a rather broad client base, particularly in
Washington.” 41 In 1950, Blackmun took the Mayo job and
remained in that position until 1959, when he was appointed to
the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit. 42
Mayo was a leader in world-class health care, attracting
160,000 patients a year by the late 1950s. 43 Blackmun saw
himself as part of the support team for eminent physicians
whose work produced breakthroughs in such fields as heart
surgery 44 and rheumatology. 45 His time there included “the
He greatly
dawn of the heart-lung bypass procedure.” 46
admired the work of the physicians and researchers, retaining
a newspaper clipping that catalogued breakthroughs achieved
40

GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 18.
Oral History, supra note 3, at 107. Persons associated with Mayo
frequently referred to the facility as “the Mayo Brothers’ Clinic” or “Mayos’ Clinic.”
Origins of the Name “Mayo Clinic,” http://www.mayoclinic.org/tradition-heritage/
origins-name.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2006).
42
GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 18, 28.
43
Letter from Leland W. Scott to David A. Lindsay, General Counsel of the
Treasury 3 (Apr. 2, 1960) [hereinafter Scott Letter] (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder
1). For historical background on the Mayo Clinic’s founding, see PAUL STARR, THE
SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 210-11 (1982).
44
Harry A. Blackmun, Remarks at the Commencement Exercises of Mayo
Medical School, 55 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 573, 576 (1980) [hereinafter Blackmun,
Remarks at Commencement] (“I was also privileged to be here when the Mayo team, in
the early 1950’s, developed their own method of [open-heart] surgery . . . . I shall not
forget the last experimental operation performed the day before the first human
patient was subjected to open-heart surgery. And I shall not forget the early weeks of
procedures here on the human heart, the successes and the failures.”); Richard C. Daly
et al., Fifty Years of Open Heart Surgery at the Mayo Clinic, 80 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 636
(2005).
45
Mayo physicians Edward C. Kendall and Phillip S. Hench won the 1950
Nobel Prize in Physiology and Medicine for their discovery on the uses of cortisone in
treating rheumatoid arthritis.
Cortisone Discovery and the Nobel Prize,
http://www.mayoclinic.org/tradition-heritage/cortisone-discovery.html
(last
visited
Sept. 1, 2006).
46
Oral History, supra note 3, at 111.
41
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at Mayo: cortisone, a heart-lung machine, open-heart surgery,
deep-chilled brain surgery, and the first post-operative
recovery room. 47
Blackmun made a point of observing medical procedures
and attending the surgeons’ biweekly discussions of recent
cases and the monthly clinical staff meetings. 48 “I felt the more
I could learn about how medicine was practiced there, the
better off I would be in advising the physicians.” 49 On occasion,
he dealt with end-of-life issues presented by patients in a
persistent vegetative state, 50 and provided legal advice as to
standards for brain death and do not resuscitate orders. 51
Abortion was rarely performed at the Mayo Clinic for
any reason, which is not surprising for a tertiary care center.
Only about one hundred abortions were performed there in the
twenty years from 1945 to 1965, almost all because of serious
somatic disease. 52 When asked in his oral history interview
what Minnesota’s law on abortion was while he was at Mayo,
Blackmun responded, “I don’t remember any abortion problems
at the time.” 53 Dr. Jane Hodgson, who trained there in
obstetrics and gynecology in the early 1940s, recalled that
“even at Mayo, we were never taught how to do a therapeutic
abortion.” 54 While Blackmun was at Mayo in the 1950s,
organized medicine viewed even legal abortions as distasteful
and morally problematic. 55
During his time at Mayo, Blackmun developed a
lawyer’s protective stance for his clients. In 1959, while being
considered for the appointment that he ultimately received to
the Eighth Circuit, he heatedly criticized a recent malpractice
47
Mayo Clinic Offers Patients a Superb System, MINN. SUNDAY TRIB., Sept.
13, 1964, (Magazine), at 10 (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 3).
48
Oral History, supra note 3, at 111.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 112, 405-06, 410-11.
51
Id. at 112.
52
Richard S. Sheldon & David G. Decker, Therapeutic Abortion at the Mayo
Clinic 1945-1965, 50 MINN. MED. 1283, 1284 (1967).
53
Oral History, supra note 3, at 112. At a later point in the interview, he
was asked again about abortion at Mayo and responded to the same effect: “I do not
recall the raising of any legal issue about abortion in the decade I was there at all.” Id.
at 192.
54
Quoted in CAROLE JOFFE, DOCTORS OF CONSCIENCE: THE STRUGGLE TO
PROVIDE ABORTION BEFORE AND AFTER ROE V. WADE 9 (1995). In fact, under the
Minnesota statute in effect during 1950s, performing an abortion was punishable by up
to four years imprisonment. MINN. STAT. § 617.18 (repealed 1974).
55
LESLIE J. REAGAN, WHEN ABORTION WAS A CRIME: WOMEN, MEDICINE, AND
LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 1867-1973, at 178 (1997).
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decision of that court, involving a surgeon who had mistakenly
left an object in the patient’s body cavity. 56 The court had
opined that “[e]verybody knows, without being told by an
expert, that it is not approved surgical practice to leave in a
patient’s body . . . any . . . foreign nonabsorbable substance.” 57
Blackmun pointed out in his letter that many reasons existed
for a good surgeon to leave nonabsorbable medical devices or
tools, such as mesh or wire, in the body. 58
In his later roles, first as a judge and then as a Justice,
Blackmun took it upon himself to speak for the medical
profession among fellow jurists. He chided Justice Black for
referring to licensed physicians as “competent,” arguing that
“competent” was redundant unless malpractice was asserted. 59
Blackmun expressed this concern about judges’ lack of
sympathy for the medical profession throughout his life. “I
have always been surprised and disturbed by the lack of
sympathy that judges often have for the problems that confront
the medical profession. . . . I have noticed this even at
conferences of our Court. I have done my best to alleviate that
feeling. . . .” 60 He wrote in a similar vein to an oncologist at
Mayo who was distressed at the continuing use of Laetrile, a
hazardous drug being sold illegally to cancer patients, despite a
protective Supreme Court opinion: 61 “Federal judges, I have
learned, do not understand medical problems very well.” 62 In a
1994 lecture on psychiatry and law, he noted that “[t]he
judiciary is somewhat intolerant of medical personnel.” 63

56
Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (May 18, 1959)
[hereinafter Blackmun Letter to Burger] (Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 13). He
reiterated this point thirty-five years later in his oral history interview. Oral History,
supra note 3, at 113.
57
Young v. Fishback, 262 F.2d 469, 470 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
58
Blackmun Letter to Burger, supra note 56.
59
Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Hugo L. Black (Feb. 26,
1971) (Blackmun Papers, Box 123, Folder 8). Blackmun later worked this point into
his decisions in Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 402 (1971), and Doe v. Bolton, 410
U.S. 179, 199 (1973).
60
Blackmun, Remarks, supra note 21, at 176.
61
United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544, 551-59 (1979) (holding that
there is no express or implied exemption for terminally ill patients from the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act requirement that a new drug be recognized as “safe and
effective” before distribution).
62
Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Dr. Charles G. Moertel, Mayo
Clinic (Mar. 16, 1982) (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 8).
63
Harry A. Blackmun, Isaac Ray Lecture: The Intersection of Law and
Psychiatry, 69 MAYO CLINIC PROC. 800, 804 (1994) [hereinafter Isaac Ray Lecture].
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Health Law as Business Law

As general counsel at the Mayo Clinic, most of
Blackmun’s practice dealt with a broad range of business, tax,
and litigation-related issues. 64 The series of memoranda that
he left for his successor, in which he described his major
concerns in some detail, provide what is probably the best
indicator of the nature of his work. He was responsible for
administering trusts set up by donors as well as for drafting
He handled real estate and
certain trust instruments. 65
corporate matters for Mayo and various entities which it
owned, such as the local airport. 66 On the litigation front, he
closely monitored malpractice claims and potential claims, 67
and represented Mayo doctors who were called as witnesses for
depositions or trials. 68 His practice also included licensure
issues 69 and miscellaneous private legal problems of the staff. 70
One of Blackmun’s major achievements was handling
the incorporation and tax issues necessary to found the
Rochester Methodist Hospital as a Mayo affiliate in 1955. 71
The hospital had been owned and operated by the Kahler
Corporation, which decided to sell off its hospital unit. 72 When
leaders at Mayo sought to arrange for a religious organization
64

Nelson, supra note 28; Clark W. Nelson, Mayo Legal Department, 68 MAYO
CLINIC PROC. 212 (1993); Oral History, supra note 3, at 109-10, 113.
65
See General Memorandum from H.A. Blackmun (Oct. 29, 1959)
[hereinafter General Memorandum] (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 1);
Memorandum from H.A. Blackmun 2-3 (Oct. 29, 1959) (Blackmun Papers, Box 13,
Folder 20).
66
General Memorandum, supra note 65, at 3, 6; Memorandum from H.A.
Blackmun to Mr. G.S. Schuster and Mr. J.W. Harwick, Re: Mayo Association (Oct. 23,
1959) (Blackmun Papers Box 13, Folder 20).
67
General Memorandum, supra note 65, at 5-6; Memorandum on Malpractice
from H.A. Blackmun (Oct. 30, 1959) (Blackmun Papers, Folder 13, Box 20);
Memorandum: Pending (Oct. 30, 1959) (Blackmun Papers, Folder 13, Box 20). Six of
the ten open cases listed were malpractice matters.
68
General Memorandum, supra note 65, at 3-5.
69
General Memorandum, supra note 65, at 1-2. Blackmun described the
licensure problems of doctors at Mayo on fellowships, some from outside the United
States, as a “vexing little problem with which I have struggled.” Id. at 1.
70
Blackmun’s papers contain a 1953 speech that he gave to the Minnesota
State Medical Association entitled “The Physician and His Estate,” consisting of tax
and estate planning advice. Harry A. Blackmun, Address at the Centennial Meeting of
the Minnesota State Medical Association (May 20, 1953) (Blackmun Papers, Box 14,
Folder 19), reprinted in 36 MINN. MED. 1033 (1953). His first Mayo-related legal
matter, while still in private practice, was a gift tax question from one of the surgeons.
Oral History, supra note 3, at 107.
71
Nelson, supra note 28.
72
History of Rochester Methodist Hospital, available at http://www.mayo
clinic.org/methodisthospital/rmhhistory.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2006).
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to operate the hospital, which would be affiliated with Mayo,
Blackmun, as “a prominent lay Methodist,” played a key role in
arranging for the Methodist church to take over operations. 73
He then led the effort “to lay the legal/financial substructure”
for the hospital. 74 He continued to serve as a director and
executive committee member for Rochester Methodist Hospital
until he joined the Supreme Court in 1970. 75
Apparently the most significant corporate and tax
dispute that arose at Mayo was a long-running battle with the
Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.).
Organizationally, “the
Mayos” consisted of three separate entities: a nonprofit
corporation (the Mayo Association), an association of
physicians and others engaged in the practice of medicine (the
Mayo Clinic), and a research fund that sponsored fellowships
for graduate medical education (the Mayo Foundation). 76 The
I.R.S had long treated the second entity, the Mayo Clinic, as a
corporation for purposes of tax law, but began to question
whether it should be classified as a partnership. 77 The I.R.S.
audited the Mayo returns from 1951 to 1955. 78
Blackmun represented the Mayos in dealings with the
I.R.S. until he was appointed to the Eighth Circuit. The Clinic
paid several million dollars a year in rent to the Mayo
Association and could deduct the rental payments as business
expenses, leaving very little net income upon which to be
taxed. 79 Because it was treated as a corporation, the Clinic
could also deduct group insurance premiums and retirement
plan contributions and provide Social Security coverage on
more favorable terms than those applying to a partnership. 80
Blackmun realized that other medical groups were
clamoring for corporate status, seeking the pre-tax benefits
73

Bill Holmes, Comments on the Occasion of the 30th Anniversary of
Rochester Memorial Hospital 2 (Jan. 16, 1984) (Blackmun Papers, Box 1549, Folder 1).
74
Id.
75
Id. at 3.
76
Scott Letter, supra note 43. From a counsel’s point of view, these three
entities were cursed with confusing names.
Mayo Association was in fact a
corporation. Mayo Clinic was treated as an association, as federal tax law defined that
term. The Mayo Foundation was a fund that had been transferred to the state of
Minnesota; it had no distinct legal existence. Harry A. Blackmun, Notes, at 1-b (Aug.
2, 1960) [hereinafter Notes, Aug. 2, 1960] (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 1); Scott
Letter, supra note 43, at 1-6.
77
Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76, at 1-a; Scott Letter, supra note 43, at 14.
78
Scott Letter, supra note 43, at 1.
79
Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76, at 8; Scott Letter, supra note 43, at 6.
80
Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76, at 8, 10.
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structure enjoyed by the Mayo staff. 81 He fought to preserve
the Clinic’s status as a membership association. Mayo’s
advantage was that its organization pre-dated the relevant
federal tax laws and thus could not be seen as motivated by tax
avoidance. 82 Blackmun was insistent that no meaningful
changes in this corporate structure should occur, such that
would give the I.R.S. an opening to re-classify the Clinic as a
partnership. 83
This is a matter of vital concern to each member of the staff.
Personal financial consequences and family well-being are at
issue. . . . [I]f the Association status is lost and the partnership
status is gained, each of you would have Federal and Minnesota
income taxes in the aggregate more than double the amount you now
pay . . . . 84

Lurking in the background was the risk that the Mayo
Association could lose its tax exemption. The exemption for
past and future contributions was essential to the financial
base upon which the Mayos’ pre-eminence rested. “Without [the
tax exemption],” he said, “the Mayo Clinic as we know it cannot
exist.” 85
Nor was Blackmun unaware of less official relationships
between Mayo and the I.R.S. He advised his successor that
“[i]f you wish to be advised whenever a tax man registers as a
patient at the Mayo Clinic, arrangements can be made for
this.” 86 Apparently these efforts succeeded; his papers indicate
that the I.R.S. allowed the Clinic to retain its corporate
status. 87
Another of Blackmun’s long-term projects as general
counsel involved lobbying federal officials for funding and other
support for Mayo. In 1953, his close friend and then Assistant
Attorney General Warren Burger suggested that Blackmun
visit Washington to meet with officials at the Department of

81
Id. at 9-11. At that time, virtually every state prohibited the corporate
practice of medicine. Mark A. Hall, Institutional Control of Physician Behavior: Legal
Barriers to Health Care Cost Containment, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 431, 509-10 (1988).
82
Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76, at 11.
83
Id. at 11-12.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 9.
86
General Memorandum, supra note 65, at 3.
87
Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76, at 1-a.
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Health, Education and Welfare (“HEW”). 88 Two years later he
suggested that Blackmun “browse around the Public Health
Institute and warm up some of your friendships with
miscellaneous people having common interests” with Mayo. 89
Drawing on Burger’s assistance to arrange participation by
federal health officials, Blackmun organized “an exploratory
trip” to Washington in 1956 for several Mayo Clinic
management staff to further “the development of Washington
contacts . . . [which are], I think, long overdue.” 90 In January
1959, Blackmun consulted Burger about the possibilities for
approaching HEW officials to support an amendment to the
Hill-Burton Act 91 to secure funding for one of the hospitals
owned by Mayo, which Blackmun described as “desperately in
need of a new physical plant.” 92 Blackmun also sought funds
for the hospital from the Rockefeller Foundation. 93
Blackmun genuinely enjoyed the business law aspects of
his work. When asked what his memories were of “the happy
events” at Mayo, he recalled “the reorganization of the Mayo
Foundation[, t]he transformation of the downtown hospitals,
which had been run by the Kahler Corporation, into an
88

Letter from Warren E. Burger to Harry A. Blackmun (Oct. 12, 1953)
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 6). The Department of Health Education and
Welfare was later renamed the Department of Health and Human Services.
89
Letter from Warren E. Burger to Harry A. Blackmun (May 12, 1955)
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 8).
90
Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (Mar. 8, 1956)
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 9). Drawing on the contacts of his old friend Warren
Burger, then on the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit, Blackmun
arranged for a luncheon meeting that included Assistant Secretaries from the
Departments of Health, Education and Welfare and Defense, as well as high-ranking
staff from the National Institutes of Health, the Veterans Administration, and Capitol
Hill. See Harry A. Blackmun, Guest List Luncheon—April 12, 1956 (Blackmun Papers,
Box 12, Folder 9).
91
The Hospital Survey and Construction Act (1964), 60 Stat. 1040 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.), commonly known as the Hill-Burton
Act, provided federal funds for the construction and modernization of public and nonprofit hospitals. CLARK C. HAVIGHURST ET AL., HEALTH CARE LAW AND POLICY 27 (2d
ed.1998). “[T]he Hill-Burton program flourished in the 1950s and 1960s and stopped
granting subsidies for hospital construction in 1974.” Id. at 30.
92
Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (Jan. 29, 1959)
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 13). At this point, Burger was a judge on the United
States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. It appears from the correspondence that
Burger had lunch with the HEW Secretary and that Mayo invited the Secretary to visit
the facility, but the documents do not indicate whether anything came from the effort.
Letter from Warren E. Burger to Harry A. Blackmun (Feb. 4, 1959) (Blackmun Papers,
Box 12, Folder 13); Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (Mar. 13,
1959) (Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 13).
93
Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (Mar. 24, 1959)
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 13).
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eleemosynary setup[, and t]he building of an experimental
hospital in Rochester, which was my responsibility . . . in
part . . . .” 94
C.

Justice Blackmun’s Departure from and Lasting Ties to
the Mayo Clinic

After spending almost a decade at Mayo, Blackmun
grew restless. In a 1957 letter to Burger, he wrote: “I feel like
going back into private practice.” 95 His ambivalence about
leaving Mayo was apparent in the list of pros and cons that he
made for himself when offered the judicial appointment: the
pros included “away from trivia” and “better use of my talents,”
while the cons included “loss of excitement” and “loss of contact
with important people.” 96
Despite his desire to leave, Justice Blackmun continued
a rich association with the institution for the rest of his life.
Almost a year after leaving his position at Mayo, he spoke to
the staff about the importance of the dispute with the I.R.S. 97
His notes for the speech indicate that he began by identifying
himself as “one who retains his admiration and devotion for the
institution and who knows it to be an institution for good,
deserving preservation and worthy of all possible protection.” 98
Blackmun continued returning to Mayo to give speeches
or to visit friends, 99 and he kept an active interest in the
institution for the remainder of his life. More than thirty years
after leaving Mayo, when President-elect Clinton began to
formulate a health reform proposal, Justice Blackmun
arranged for Mayo officials to attend a forum for health care
experts at the Aspen Institute. 100 During the taping of his oral
history in 1994, soon after his retirement, he told interviewer
94

Oral History, supra note 3, at 109.
Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Warren E. Burger (Oct. 24, 1957)
(Blackmun Papers, Box 12, Folder 11).
96
GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 27.
97
Notes, Aug. 2, 1960, supra note 76.
98
Id. at 1.
99
His speeches included the 1980 commencement address at the medical
school, a speech on pediatrics and law and a speech on the goals of longevity. See, e.g.,
Harry A. Blackmun, Draft of Speech for Mayo Clinic Pediatric Days (Sept. 28, 1995)
[hereinafter Mayo Clinic Pediatric Days Speech] (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 8).
100
Letter from Harry A. Blackmun to Dr. James R. McPherson, Mayo Clinic
(Nov. 27, 1992) (Blackmun Papers, Box 14, Folder 8). In his November 27 letter,
Blackmun wrote: “I just feel that Mayo should be in the forefront of health care plan
discussions and decisions and not have someone else take over the lead.” Id.
95
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Harold Koh that “Dottie and I still have that feeling of
reverence for Mayos.” 101 After his death, at his request, a
portion of his ashes were scattered on the grounds of the Mayo
Clinic. 102
Blackmun surely treasured the opportunity that he had
while at Mayo to be part of an extraordinary institution and to
develop front-row knowledge of medical breakthroughs and
superior clinical care. His practice, however, centered on
corporate, tax, and litigation matters.
This fuller
understanding of Blackmun’s responsibilities there should
make plain that, whatever the impact of his time at Mayo, he
was not following a Mayo script in writing Roe.
II.

PRAGMATIC JUDGING

Blackmun was sworn in as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court on June 9, 1970. 103 Opportunities to undertake
the role of protector of medicine in the halls of law arose in his
first term on the Court, in three health-related cases: United
States v. Vuitch, 104 the first abortion case to reach the Supreme
Court; Richardson v. Perales, 105 an appeal from a denial of
disability benefits; and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 106 a challenge to a
Massachusetts
law
prohibiting
the
distribution
of
contraceptives to unmarried persons. These cases afforded
Justice Blackmun the opportunity to proffer his Mayo
background as a source of expertise among his colleagues, a
capacity that must have been all the more welcome in the wake
of press derision of him as Chief Justice Burger’s “Minnesota
twin.” 107 Blackmun’s papers from these early cases indicate
that he asserted himself on the Court as someone with special
ties to medicine, but the attitudes that he brought to
evaluating cases involving physicians were on the whole more
pragmatic than idealizing.

101
102
103
104
105
106
107

Oral History, supra note 3, at 113.
GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 248.
Id. at 53.
402 U.S. 62 (1971).
402 U.S. 389 (1972).
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Jenkins, supra note 22, at 22.
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United States v. Vuitch

In Vuitch, a D.C. physician won dismissal of an
indictment for performing an abortion on the ground that the
statute was impermissibly vague. 108 The D.C. law prohibited
abortion “unless . . . necessary for the preservation of the
mother’s life or health.” 109 The district court had found the
statute defective based on the uncertain meaning of “health.” 110
That court ruled that the statute’s failure to define “health” left
“no clear standard” for the defendant or the jury to determine
“what degree of mental or physical health or combination of the
two” was necessary to avoid prosecution. 111
When the case got to the Supreme Court, Justice
Blackmun took a pragmatic view of the physician’s
predicament. He noted that:
[T]he vagueness exists in the . . . justification clause. Thus, the more
vague the statute, the better it is really for the defendant. If [it] is
broad, then the umbrella of justification is a large one. I, for one,
could pump a lot of area into the exception. This . . . rather inclines
me not to be too concerned about vagueness, and . . . to uphold the
statute and let the defendant . . . physician[] roam at large in an
attempt to prove justification. 112

Based on Griswold v. Connecticut, 113 counsel for Vuitch
also argued for an extension of the privacy right 114 along the
lines suggested by Thomas Emerson, who had written that the
privacy right which had been articulated in Griswold could
“consist[] primarily in the right to have or not have children,
and to plan a family. . . . On the same view of the scope of the
right to privacy, the way would be open for an attack upon
significant aspects of the abortion laws.” 115 Blackmun’s private
notes to himself when he first read the briefs in the case
indicated that he was not closed to the privacy claim:

108

United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032 (D.D.C. 1969), rev’d, 402 U.S.

62 (1971).
109

Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 67-68 (quoting D.C. CODE ANN. § 22-201 (1967)).
Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. at 1034.
111
Id.
112
Harry A. Blackmun, Undated Notes on United States v. Vuitch 3
[hereinafter Vuitch Notes] (Blackmun Papers, Box 123, Folder 9).
113
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
114
Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72-73.
115
Thomas I. Emerson, Nine Justices in Search of a Doctrine, 64 MICH. L.
REV. 219, 232 (1965).
110

164

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:1

I may have to push myself a bit, but I would not be offended by the
extension of privacy concepts to the point presented by the present
case . . . [if the majority reached this issue] I could go along with any
reasonable interpretation of the problem on principles of privacy. 116

Blackmun’s notes to himself also indicated his recognition of
the unfairness of laws that disadvantaged poor women. 117
At oral argument, Blackmun expressed skepticism
about the vagueness claim. When Vuitch’s lawyer asserted at
oral argument that only the individual doctor’s judgment could
be the basis for a definition of health, Blackmun responded,
It’s difficult for me to accept your explanation because, and I
shouldn’t go on my own experience, but I have seen physician after
physician after physician say the same thing about
malpractice . . . [and] I have known many physicians who are not
concerned about [the chilling effect of the law] in this decisionmaking and who are courageous and make the decisions if they have
to. 118

The government’s theory was that “health” should be
construed broadly, so that a physician would be protected
unless he was performing abortions on demand, that is,
performing the procedure without a determination of any
physical or mental health-related need for it. 119 The Supreme
Court adopted that interpretation of the statute and reversed
the district court. 120 Thus, the end result, as Justice White
reiterated in his concurrence, was that physicians would be
protected only if an abortion was “dictated by health
considerations.” 121 Counsel for the government had asserted at
oral argument that prosecution of a doctor would go forward if
there was proof that “in every single case where a woman
requested an abortion he performed it.” 122

116

Vuitch Notes, supra note 112, at 3.
Blackmun’s private notes on Vuitch include as one of his questions about
the case, “Does inability to go elsewhere for an abortion, because of lack of finances,
constitute a denial of equal protection?” Harry A. Blackmun, Private Notes on United
States v. Vuitch (Dec. 28, 1970) (Blackmun Papers, Box 123, Folder 8).
118
Transcript of Oral Argument at 47, United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62
(1971) (No. 84).
119
Id. at 17-18, 63.
120
Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 72. The Court also held that the prosecution had the
burden to prove that an abortion was not necessary for the woman’s life or health. Id.
at 71.
121
Id. at 73 (White, J., concurring).
122
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 118, at 64.
117

2006]

THE MYTH OF MEDICAL INDEPENDENCE

165

Blackmun would not have reached the merits at all; he
concluded that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction. 123
Ultimately, he concurred in the majority’s decision as to
vagueness in order to create a majority of a badly splintered
court, and thereby resolve the case. 124 Vuitch presented the
first opportunity for Blackmun to seize if his overriding concern
had been to protect physicians from criminal prosecutions, but
he let it pass. It is particularly telling that he did not join the
concurring opinion of either Justice Douglas, who expressed his
desire to “leave to the experts the drafting of abortion laws that
protect good-faith medical practitioners[;]” 125 or of Justice
Stewart, who believed that a good faith determination of health
needs by a physician provided full immunity from prosecution
under the D.C. law. 126
B.

Richardson v. Perales

In Perales, which was argued the day after Vuitch, 127
Blackmun wrote one of his first opinions for the Court. The
case turned on the question of whether a doctor’s written report
could be admitted into evidence or should be excluded as
His initial thoughts on the case reflect his
hearsay. 128
identification with physicians: “I have always felt that written
medical records qualify as business records and, hence, are an
exception to the ordinary hearsay rules. I also get the feeling
that if records of this kind cannot be introduced into evidence,
the resulting burden on the medical profession . . . will be
phenomenal.” 129

123
Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 81 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Criminal Appeals Act
granted the Court jurisdiction in criminal cases over direct appeals from district court
judgments dismissing an indictment due to the invalidity of the statute on which the
indictment was founded. Id. at 64 (majority opinion) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3731). The
majority found that this Act applied to such appeals from the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia concerning an abortion statute that applied only to
the District. Id. at 64-66. Blackmun joined Harlan’s opinion dissenting as to
jurisdiction. Id. at 81 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
124
Vuitch, 402 U.S. at 97-98 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
125
Id. at 80 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
126
Id. at 97 (Stewart, J., dissenting in part).
127
Vuitch was argued on January 12, 1971, 402 U.S. at 62, and Perales on
January 13, 402 U.S. at 389.
128
Perales, 402 U.S. at 402.
129
Harry A. Blackmun, Undated Notes on Richardson v. Perales 1 (Blackmun
Papers, Box 125, Folder 2).
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The notes Blackmun took during oral argument
predicted that “I should catch this if I am in majority.” 130 He
did “catch it,” and ruled on behalf of the Court that a written
report by a doctor who had examined the patient should be
admitted, despite the doctor’s absence from the hearing and the
inability of the claimant to cross-examine. 131 This opinion
strikes an almost mawkish note: “We cannot, and do not,
ascribe bias to the work of these independent physicians, or
any interest on their part in the outcome of the administrative
proceeding beyond the professional curiosity a dedicated
medical man possesses.” 132
During this case, Blackmun succeeded in winning
recognition for the value of his experience at the Mayo Clinic.
Justice John Harlan, in communicating that he would join the
draft opinion that Blackmun had circulated in Perales, told
him: “I am consumed with admiration for your mastery of the
medical lexicon, and, although I feel beyond my depth in this
field, I am perfectly content to leave my legal conscience in
your careful hands on this score.” 133 Harlan’s personal note
must have been a welcome expression of esteem for Blackmun
in his first year on the Court and may have reinforced the
value he placed on his Mayo background.
C.

Eisenstadt v. Baird

In Eisenstadt v. Baird, 134 the Court struck down a
Massachusetts statute that prohibited the distribution of
contraceptives to unmarried persons. The Court’s analysis was
grounded in the recognition of a right of marital privacy,
including the right to use contraceptives in Griswold v.

130
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes on Argument in
Richardson v. Perales (Jan. 13, 1971) (Blackmun Papers, Box 125, Folder 2).
131
Perales, 402 U.S. at 402. Blackmun’s opinion drew a spirited dissent from
Justice Douglas, joined by Justices Black and Brennan, who castigated the agency for
using a “stable of defense doctors without submitting them to cross-examination.” Id.
at 414 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
132
Id. at 403 (majority opinion). Blackmun also cited a case striking a similar
tone in which the court of appeals ruled admissible the written report of an examining
physician: the report is made “as a professional matter by a member of a learned and
honorable profession in whom the sense of professional pride, as well as the sense of
official duty, is conducive to truth and accuracy.” Long v. United States, 59 F.2d 602,
603 (4th Cir. 1932).
133
Letter from Justice John M. Harlan to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Apr.
21, 1971) (Blackmun Papers, Box 125, Folder 2).
134
405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972).
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Connecticut. 135 Justice Brennan’s opinion famously declared
that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free of unwarranted
governmental intrusion into . . . the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.” 136
Eisenstadt was pending before the Court while
Blackmun was struggling to produce his first drafts in Roe and
Doe. 137 Justice Brennan used the opportunity of his assignment
in Eisenstadt to build a doctrinal bridge between Griswold’s
right of marital privacy and the application of privacy outside
of marriage, as would also be required in the abortion cases. 138
Blackmun did not join Brennan’s opinion. He opted
instead to concur in the result by joining the separate opinion
of Justice White, 139 who ironically became his primary nemesis
in the abortion cases. White and Blackmun focused on the fact
that Baird had been prosecuted on the ground that he was
neither a physician nor a pharmacist, and therefore was barred
under the statute from distributing contraceptives to anyone,
regardless of marital status. 140 White and Blackmun’s opinion
further noted that there was no record evidence of the marital
status of those to whom Baird had in fact distributed the
vaginal foam contraceptive. 141
The White-Blackmun concurrence drew from Griswold
the principle that restrictions burdening a married person’s use
of contraceptives—as the Massachusetts statute did by its
limitation of distribution to physicians or pharmacists—must
be supported by evidence demonstrating the necessity of the
burden to the achievement of the statutory purpose of
protecting health. 142 Because the statute before the Court
lacked any such justification and because foam was not a
prescription drug, they reasoned that the law had to fail,
regardless of the marital status of the distributee in the
particular case: “Nothing in the record even suggests that the
135

381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
137
Id. at 438.
138
In Roe, Justice Blackmun cited Eisenstadt as authority for the privacy
right extending to contraception as distinct from marriage. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152 (1973) (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54).
139
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 460.
140
Id. at 462 (White, J., concurring) (“The gravamen of the offense charged
was that Baird had no license and therefore no authority to distribute to anyone.”).
141
Id. at 464.
142
Id. at 463.
136
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distribution of vaginal foam should be accompanied by medical
advice in order to protect the user’s health.” 143
Blackmun’s position in Eisenstadt offers another
indication that however strong his concern for medical practice,
he could recognize when a purported protection of it was a
pretext for other goals. The distinction in Eisenstadt may seem
obvious, but deference to the state’s authority to restrict
distribution of health-related products to health professionals
was precisely the basis for Chief Justice Burger’s dissent. 144
Burger spent the bulk of his dissenting opinion attacking the
White-Blackmun concurrence, declaring that there is “nothing
arbitrary in a requirement of medical supervision.” 145 Burger
argued that there was no constitutional basis for holding “that
a State must allow someone without medical training the same
power to distribute this medicinal substance as is enjoyed by a
physician.” 146
Of course one cannot know whether Burger may have
stressed this point in an attempt to persuade Blackmun to join
him, but if he did, the gambit failed. Blackmun was coming to
his own conclusions in Eisenstadt at precisely the same time
that he was struggling with the abortion issue.
D.

Rights Talk

Blackmun did not arrive on the Court with a closed
mind as to possible expansion of individual rights doctrine, but
neither was he eager to engage those issues. During his second
term, the Supreme Court ruled for the first time that a
statutory distinction between men and women violated the
Equal Protection Clause. In Reed v. Reed, 147 ACLU lawyers led
by Ruth Bader Ginsburg challenged an Idaho law that required
appointment of a male rather than a female if both were
equally entitled by consanguinity to administer a decedent’s
estate. 148
Blackmun’s private notes on the case describe it as “a
very simple little case” which had generated “a very lengthy
brief [from the ACLU] filled with emotion and historical
143
144
145
146
147
148

Id. at 464 (1972).
Id. at 467-70 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 470.
Id. at 471.
404 U.S. 71 (1971).
Id. at 73-74.
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context about the inferior status of women.” 149 Blackmun found
the brief “mildly offensive and arrogant, but . . . it has the
better side of the case.” 150 He expressed hope that the Court
would strike down the statute in “a fairly brief and simple
opinion,” 151 which it did, without specifying the level of review
being utilized. 152
Intriguingly, though, Blackmun also described himself
as “inclined to feel that sex can be considered a suspect
classification just as race. . . .” 153 He was troubled by the
argument that the Fourteenth Amendment clearly had not
been intended to reach sex-based discrimination when it was
adopted, but concluded that “my own feeling is that these
constitutional provisions must have some flexibility and
expansiveness in them as, in theory, we ourselves progress and
expand in our concepts of equality.” 154
The understanding of sex discrimination that he
brought to the Court did not encompass pregnancy, however.
In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 155 the court below had
upheld a hiring policy which discriminated against women with
small children, concluding that it did not violate the federal
Blackmun’s
statutory ban against sex discrimination. 156
private notes indicate that he agreed with this perspective:
At this point, my inclination is in favor of affirmance. . . . [T]he
policy, if there was a policy, was not based on sex,
and . . . disinclination to hire a woman with pre-school children has

149
Harry A. Blackmun, Notes on Reed v. Reed 1 (Oct. 18, 1971) [hereinafter
Reed Notes] (Blackmun Papers, Box 135, Folder 10).
150
Id. at 2.
151
Id. at 4.
152
Reed, 404 U.S. at 76 (“A classification ‘must be reasonable, not arbitrary,
and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to
the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated
alike.’” (quoting Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920))).
153
Reed Notes, supra note 149, at 2. Three years later, Blackmun joined an
opinion specifically rejecting strict scrutiny for sex-based discrimination on the ground
that the Court should exercise restraint in light of the debates then underway about
adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 692
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring). In 1976, he joined a majority opinion finding that sexbased classifications should be subjected to an intermediate level of scrutiny under the
Equal Protection Clause. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976).
154
Reed Notes, supra note 149, at 3.
155
400 U.S. 542 (1971).
156
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 4 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated,
400 U.S. 542 (1971).
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some rationality behind it. I do not think it is the kind of thing
which the statute was intended to reach. 157

The full Court ultimately vacated the summary judgment for
defendant and remanded, holding that a blanket difference in
hiring policies for men and women with school-age children
was unlawful unless it could be justified as a bona fide
Only by understanding this
occupational qualification. 158
history is it not surprising that Blackmun joined a majority
opinion the year after he wrote Roe in which the Court held
pregnancy not to be a sex-based classification under the Equal
Protection Clause. 159
In sum, these early cases provide a window into
Blackmun’s approach to issues involving both law and
medicine at a uniquely revealing time.
At this point,
Blackmun’s reasoning was not affected by whatever caution or
self-censorship followed the eruption of controversy after Roe.
His actions suggest that although he enjoyed his quasi-insider
status vis-à-vis medicine, he also used this knowledge base to
resist what he found to be loose reasoning about how law
affected medical practice.
III.

THE CRUCIBLE OF ROE V. WADE

One of the most significant aspects of the Blackmun
papers is what they do not contain. Debates over abortion both
triggered and epitomized social ruptures that left deep, sharp
cuts in the body politic, along vectors of religion, sexuality and
political philosophy. Yet it is apparent from his papers that
Justice Blackmun brought no conscious agenda to this issue;
indeed, he seems to have given it very little thought prior to
joining the Court. 160
A.

A Chronology

When the Supreme Court first focused on Roe v. Wade,
Justices Black and Harlan had recently died, and the Court

157
Harry A. Blackmun, Notes on Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. 2 (Dec. 7,
1970) (Blackmun Papers, Box 122, Folder 8).
158
Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
159
Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 494 (1974).
160
Referring to the lack of contact that he had with abortion issues while at
Mayo, Blackmun said that “[a]ll of that developed later with the cases preliminary to
Roe against Wade.” Oral History, supra note 3, at 192.
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began the 1971 term with only seven Justices. 161 At Chief
Justice Burger’s request, Blackmun, Potter Stewart, and Byron
White served as a subcommittee to identify pending cases that
the Court could proceed to consider with only seven Justices,
on the expectation that none would raise especially difficult or
important questions. 162 They included Roe on that list. “[W]e
didn’t think it was that important at that time,” Blackmun
noted later. 163 “How wrong we were.” 164
Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton were first argued in
December 1971 to a seven-justice Court. 165 Roe involved a
challenge to the Texas statute which prohibited all abortions
Doe
except those necessary to save the woman’s life. 166
concerned the Georgia law adopted in 1968 based on
recommendations from the American Law Institute. 167
Georgia’s scheme required that three doctors independently
examine the pregnant woman, that the abortion be performed
in an accredited hospital, and that at least three members of
the hospital staff approve the procedure. 168
The pro-choice advocates presented a mix of privacy and
medical rights arguments to the Court. The birth control
movement had been using arguments for physician control for
several decades, which then migrated to abortion reform
efforts. 169 In a strange overlap, counsel for Roe and Doe
included partially identical, lengthy descriptions of medical
facts related to abortion in both the initial appellants’ brief and
the amicus brief filed by the American College of Obstetricians
The substantive argument in the
and Gynecologists. 170
161

Id. at 193.
Id.
163
Id.
164
Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Chief Justice William H.
Rehnquist (July 20, 1987) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 3).
165
Oral History, supra note 3, at 193.
166
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 117-18 (1973) (citing TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§§ 1191-1196).
167
Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 182 (1973) (citing GA. CODE ANN. §§ 26-120126-1203). The ALI had proposed a model statute requiring that two physicians certify
that an abortion was necessary because of the physical or mental health of the
pregnant woman or the risk of birth defects or that the pregnancy resulted from rape,
incest or other violence. See id. at 205-06 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 230.3(2)-(3)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962)).
168
Id. at 203 (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1202(b)(3)-(5)).
169
DAVID J. GARROW, LIBERTY AND SEXUALITY: THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY AND
THE MAKING OF ROE V. WADE 13-14, 379-80 (1994).
170
Compare Brief for Appellants at 18-47, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)
(No. 70-18), 1971 WL 128054, with Motion for Leave to File a Brief and Brief as Amici
162
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appellants’ brief began with an assertion of a right to seek and
receive medical care, 171 followed by a section outlining various
aspects of a privacy right, including the right of physicians to
administer health care without arbitrary state interference. 172
Although some amici presented a sex discrimination
argument, 173 there is no indication in the papers of Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, or Douglas that members of the Court
ever discussed a women’s equality analysis.
At the conference following the argument, there
appeared to be a majority for finding the Texas law
unconstitutional, but no clear result as to the Georgia law. 174
During the conference, Blackmun expressed his view that the
Texas law was too restrictive, but the Georgia law was “pretty
good and [struck] a good balance” of the competing interests. 175
Chief Justice Burger assigned the cases to Blackmun,
whose first step was to recommend re-argument before what
had become a full nine-member Court with the confirmation of
Justices Powell and Rehnquist. 176 Apparently no other Justice
supported the suggestion, and Blackmun completed drafts in
both cases in May 1972. 177 Justice Blackmun’s initial draft of
an opinion in Roe rested on vagueness grounds, the argument
that the Texas law gave too little guidance and clarity to enable
physicians to exercise their best medical judgment. 178 Justices
Brennan and Douglas responded quickly and sharply that the

Curiae for the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists et al. at 7-21, Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (No. 70-40), 1971 WL 126685.
171
Brief for Appellants, supra note 170, at 94-98.
172
Id. at 110.
173
See Reva B. Siegel, Siegel, J., concurring, in WHAT ROE V. WADE SHOULD
HAVE SAID 79, 81 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005).
174
Oral History, supra note 3, at 193 (“[I]t ended up with the Court members,
nearly all of them, not being very firm in their conviction.”).
175
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Undated Handwritten Notes on Doe v. Bolton
(Blackmun Papers, Box 152, Folder 2).
176
Paul R. Hoeber et al., Notes, Opinions of William J. Brennan, Jr., at XLII
(Oct. Term, 1971) [hereinafter Hoeber Notes] (on file with Library of Congress,
Manuscript Division, The William J. Brennan Papers, Box II:6, Folder 14 [hereinafter
Brennan Papers]).
177
Id. at XLIV.
178
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Draft Opinion of Roe v. Wade (May 18, 1972)
(Blackmun Papers, Box 141, Folder 4). Blackmun framed the constitutional question
as implicating the Ninth Amendment, not the Due Process Clause: “There is no
need . . . to pass upon [Roe’s] contention that under the Ninth Amendment a pregnant
woman has an absolute right to an abortion, or even to consider the opposing rights of
the embryo or fetus . . . .” Id. at 16.
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case should be decided on “the core constitutional question.” 179
Blackmun’s first draft in Doe relied on privacy to strike the
Georgia statute. 180 “This was not the easiest conclusion for me
to reach,” Blackmun told his fellow Justices in the cover
memorandum. 181 His explanation conveys his hesitancy at
using a rights approach to undercut self-regulation within the
medical profession:
I have worked closely with supervisory hospital committees set up by
the medical profession itself, and I have seen them operate over
extensive periods. I can state with complete conviction that they
serve a high purpose in maintaining standards and in keeping the
overzealous
surgeon’s
knife
sheathed. . . . [I]ntraprofessional
restraints of this kind have accomplished much that is unnoticed
and certainly is unappreciated by people generally.
I have also seen abortion mills in operation and the general misery
they have caused despite their being run by otherwise “competent”
technicians. 182

Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall quickly joined. 183
With time running out in the term, Blackmun again suggested
deferral until the next term of the Court, and Chief Justice
Burger ordered re-argument in the fall. 184
During the summer of 1972, Blackmun spent ten days
in the Mayo Clinic library doing additional research and
reworking his draft opinions. 185 The second set of arguments
came in October 1972, after the two new Justices had joined
the Court. 186 The Chief Justice re-assigned the cases to

179
Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Harry A. Blackmun
(May 18, 1972) (Brennan Papers, Box I-285, Folder 9); see also Letter from Justice
William O. Douglas to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (May 19, 1972) (on file with Library
Congress, Manuscript Division, The William O. Douglas Papers, Box 1589 [hereinafter
Douglas Papers]).
180
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Harry A. Blackmun 1-2 (May
31, 1972) (Brennan Papers, Box I-286, Folder 1). The “Notes” document from Justice
Brennan’s chambers records that in conference, “Justice Blackmun urged that it would
be politically unwise for the Court to strike down both the death penalty . . . and the
abortion laws at the same time.” Hoeber Notes, supra note 176, at LI.
181
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Harry A. Blackmun 1 (May
25, 1972) (Brennan Papers, Box I-286, Folder 1).
182
Id. at 1-2.
183
GARROW, supra note 169, at 551.
184
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra
note 180, at 1.
185
Oral History, supra note 3, at 196-98. But, he later insisted, “I never
discussed [the case] at all with any physician.” Id. at 201.
186
GARROW, supra note 169, at 534, 563.
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Blackmun. 187 The result in the abortion cases was sealed when,
at the Court’s conference following the second argument,
Justice Powell weighed in strongly on the side of striking down
both statutes. 188 Observers had speculated that the two new
Nixon appointees might spell defeat for abortion rights
advocates. 189 Ironically, Justice Powell sealed the victory for
the Brennan-Douglas-Marshall approach. His unexpected and
unambivalent response was the single most dramatic turn
during the Court’s internal deliberations.
Blackmun circulated a draft of Roe a month after the
second oral argument, noting that it “has proved for me to be
both difficult and elusive.” 190 Although he adopted a privacy
analysis in this draft, he also pointedly preserved the Vuitch
outcome, to uphold a statute which required that a doctor
determine that an abortion was necessary for a woman’s
“health,” as construed in that case:
I have attempted to preserve Vuitch in its entirety. You will recall
that the attack on the Vuitch statute was restricted to the issue of
vagueness. I would dislike to have to undergo another [challenge]
based, this time on privacy grounds. I, for one, am willing to
continue the approval of the Vuitch-type statute on privacy as well
as on vagueness. 191

At this point, Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall made
important interventions in how the opinions were shaped,
affecting the use and extent of privacy language and the
concept of viability. 192
By the time the opinions were announced in January
1973, Roe held, as the lead opinion, that the liberty protected
under the Fourteenth Amendment “encompass[ed] a woman’s
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy,” 193 but that
the state’s interests in maternal health and fetal life justified
restrictions on abortion after the first trimester. 194 Georgia’s
process-focused restrictions at issue in Doe intruded on the first

187
188

GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 95.
See infra text accompanying notes 260-64, for explication of Powell’s

position.
189

GARROW, supra note 169, at 521.
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Nov. 21,
1972) (Blackmun Papers Fox 151, Folder 6).
191
Id. (citation omitted).
192
See infra text accompanying notes 256-59, 261-64.
193
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
194
Id. at 163-64.
190
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trimester’s zone of privacy and thus also were found
unconstitutional. 195
Although the Justices realized that “we had a bull by
the tail” by the time of the second oral argument, 196 their
correspondence throughout 1971 and 1972 did not evidence any
special vehemence of views as to the issues it raised. Six weeks
before the decision was announced, Blackmun noted to Lewis
Powell that “I have not had any intimation of violent
disagreement, but I am informed that Byron and Bill
Rehnquist will dissent at least in part.” 197 Justice Rehnquist
had written that he would “probably still file a dissent,
although more limited than I had contemplated after the
Conference.” 198 A note with a similar tone had also arrived
later from Justice White: “I have been struggling with these
cases.
I shall probably end up concurring in part and
dissenting in part.” 199 When Justice White read his dissent
from the bench, Blackmun thought that White “was rather
emotional in delivering the dissent. . . . It surprised me a
little[.] I’ve never asked him [why].” 200 After all, as Blackmun
said during a television interview, “[it] was not such a
revolutionary opinion at the time.” 201
B.

The Hippocratic Oath

Alfred Hitchcock used the term “Macguffin” to signify a
mysterious plot objective which appears initially to be
determinative, but turns out in the end to be beside the
point. 202 If there is a macguffin in the story of Justice
Blackmun and the medicalized framing of the right to abortion,
it is the Hippocratic Oath.

195

Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 195 (1973).
Oral History, supra note 3, at 200.
197
Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. 1
(Dec. 4, 1972) [hereinafter Blackmun-Powell Letter] (Blackmun Papers, Box 151,
Folder 3).
198
Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice Harry A. Blackmun
(Nov. 24, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 4).
199
Letter from Justice Byron R. White to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Dec. 1,
1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 4).
200
Oral History, supra note 3, at 492.
201
GARROW, supra note 169, at 599 (citing In Search of the Constitution: Mr.
Justice Blackmun (PBS television broadcast Apr. 26, 1987)).
202
PATRICK MCGILLIGAN, ALFRED HITCHCOCK: A LIFE IN DARKNESS AND
LIGHT 158-59 (2003).
196
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Blackmun’s concern with whether the Hippocratic Oath
proscribed abortion arose in Vuitch. Among the documents
that Justice Blackmun collected and saved in connection with
that case, two concern the oath. One is a copy of its text. 203
The other is an article by a Mayo Clinic physician arguing that
while performing an abortion to save the pregnant woman’s life
was within the spirit of the oath because its goal was to save
life, an abortion based on less dire “health” reasons violated the
oath. 204
Blackmun was dogged in researching its full meaning
and impact. 205 Conducting further research on the oath was a
primary motivation for Justice Blackmun’s recommendation
that the cases be put over to the next term and for the ten days
he spent in the Mayo Clinic library in the summer of 1972. 206
He “wanted to do a lot more work, including the research on
the Hippocratic Oath, find out how important that was.” 207
When asked what kind of books he sought at Mayo, Blackmun
responded, “Anything that had to do with the Hippocratic
Oath, mainly.” 208 When asked about any surprising research
discoveries, Blackmun identified the book by Ludwig Edelstein
on the oath, which he cited in the opinion. 209 “[I]t persuaded
me that [the oath] was the product of a certain geographical
area and of a certain group of medical specialists in that area.
It fortified me and lessened the significance of the oath as a
matter of general medical principle.” 210
Blackmun told Harold Koh that “having worked at a
medical institution, I can remember that in a majority of the
examining rooms, the Hippocratic Oath was on the wall.” 211 He
also recalled numerous medical school graduations at which

203

Hippocratic Oath (Blackmun Papers, Box 123, Folder 8).
Robert D. Knapp, Jr., Similarly I Will Not . . . Cause Abortion, 122 J. LA.
ST. MED. SOC. 297 (1970).
205
Blackmun requested historical material about abortion less than a month
after the first argument. Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Thomas E. Keys,
Mayo Clinic (Dec. 17, 1971) (Blackmun Papers, Box 152, Folder 2). In response, a
librarian at the Mayo Clinic sent him an article arguing that the ban on abortion was
not included in the original version of the oath. Letter from Thomas E. Keys to Justice
Harry A. Blackmun (Dec. 23, 1971) (Blackmun Papers, Box 152, Folder 2).
206
Oral History, supra note 3, at 489-90.
207
Id. at 196.
208
Id. at 197.
209
Id.; see, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130 nn.10-12 (1973).
210
Oral History, supra note 3, at 197-98.
211
Id. at 194.
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newly-minted physicians took the oath. 212 The oath is still
recited at almost all medical school commencements, although
its wording has been revised from the traditional form. 213 For
physicians practicing during the 1950s, when Blackmun was at
Mayo, its text contained the promise to do no harm in these or
very similar terms:
I will use treatment to help the sick according to my ability and
judgment, but never with a view to injury and wrong-doing. Neither
will I administer a poison to anybody when asked to do so, nor will I
suggest such a course. Similarly, I will not give a woman a pessary
to cause abortion. 214

According to one doctor who advocated for liberalizing abortion
laws, the oath had an impact on medical training: “[A]ntiabortion messages were given like a broken record—you can’t
violate the Hippocratic [O]ath.” 215
Blackmun’s major annoyance with the second oral
argument was the missing analysis of the oath: the reargument “was extraordinarily unhelpful as far as the
He was especially
Hippocratic Oath was concerned.” 216
irritated by Sarah Weddington, attorney for the plaintiffs in
Roe. When he asked, “Do you have any comment about the
Hippocratic Oath,” she responded by describing how many
eminent physicians had signed an amicus brief supporting her
clients. 217 Blackmun cut her off, noting that equally eminent
physicians had signed a brief for the other side, and directed
her back to his query: “Tell me why you didn’t discuss the
Hippocratic Oath.” 218
Weddington faced up to the question, which she
obviously had not anticipated, and responded that the oath did
not pertain either to the scope of a woman’s right under the
Constitution, nor did it address whether the state had a
compelling interest in restricting abortion. “[T]he fact that the
medical profession at one time had adopted the Hippocratic
212

Id.
LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH: TEXT, TRANSLATION, AND
INTERPRETATION 3 (1943).
214
Quoted in Knapp, supra note 204, at 297. The text of the Oath found in
Blackmun’s papers in Vuitch varies slightly; the key sentence is, “Nor will I give a
woman a pessary to procure abortion.” Hippocratic Oath, supra note 203.
215
JOFFE, supra note 54, at 33.
216
Oral History, supra note 3, at 198.
217
Transcript of Reargument at 7, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 7018), available at http://www.oyez.org/oyez/resource/case/334/reargument/transcript.
218
Id.
213
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[O]ath does not weigh upon the fundamental constitutional
Blackmun’s frustration is
rights involved,” she stated. 219
apparent in his reply: “Of course, it’s the only definitive
statement of ethics of the medical profession. I take it from
what you said that . . . you didn’t even footnote it, because it’s
old? That’s about, really, what you’re saying?” 220
Blackmun’s actual discussion of the oath, after all his
concern with it, consumes only four paragraphs on three
pages. 221 He posits the apparent contradiction between its
injunction against performing abortions and the frequency of
abortion during the Greek and Roman empires. 222 What
resolved this conflict for him was a history of the oath that he
discovered in the Mayo Clinic library, which described it as
dogma, the manifesto of only one school of Greek philosophers,
“and not the expression of an absolute standard of medical
conduct.” 223
Blackmun’s concern with the oath reflects the value he
placed on professional self-regulation. Blackmun saw the oath
as a particularly important text in the relationship between
physician, patient, and the state.
His impatience with
Weddington’s legalistic response to his question during oral
argument suggests that for him the oath embodied a command
which stood outside of law; that its power lay in its quasijuridical authority within the realm of medicine. Weddington
was surely correct that its text did not speak to the questions
raised by the conflicting claims of the pregnant woman and the
state.
But it did create a potential collision between
professional self-regulation and judicial authority, a conflict
that likely would have been excruciating for Blackmun.
C.

Justice Douglas’s “Right to Health”

At the conference following the first round of abortion
arguments, Blackmun’s notes indicate that Douglas argued
that
abortion
was
a
“medical
and
psychiatric
problem . . . Doctor acting in good faith [must have] absolute
immunity when he seeks to protect the life or the health” of his

219
220
221
222
223

Id.
Id.
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 130-32 (1973).
Id. at 130-31.
Id. at 132 (quoting LUDWIG EDELSTEIN, THE HIPPOCRATIC OATH 63 (1943)).
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patient. 224 Justice Stewart agreed with Douglas on the merits,
not surprisingly in light of his concurring opinion in Vuitch. 225
Following the conference, Justice Douglas immediately began
drafting.
The first opinion in the abortion cases was written by
Justice Douglas. Before the end of December, Douglas drafted
an opinion in Doe which he sent only to Brennan. 226 The
Douglas draft identified multiple defects in the Georgia statute,
and prompted a response from Brennan which urged him to
prioritize privacy in his analysis. 227 Brennan argued that
Douglas’s draft section on “the right to care for one’s health”
should be pegged to privacy rather than the First
Amendment 228 and that “the right of privacy in the matter of
abortions means that the decision is that of the woman and her
Justice Douglas adopted some but not all of
alone.” 229
Brennan’s suggestions; from the perspective of the Brennan
chambers, “he still seemed to want to give the physicianpatient relationship constitutional significance rather than rest
the case entirely on the woman’s right of privacy.” 230
Douglas’s published concurrence argued that the term
“liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment included three of “the
rights retained by the people” referenced in the Ninth
Amendment. 231 Among these was “the freedom to care for one’s
health and person, freedom from bodily restraint or
compulsion, freedom to walk, stroll or loaf.” 232 Douglas also
acknowledged that the state had legitimate interests in the
woman’s health and in fetal life after quickening, which “justify
the State in treating the procedure as a medical one.” 233

224
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes 2 (Dec. 1971) (Blackmun
Papers, Box 151, Folder 4).
225
Id. at 3. See text supra at note 126 regarding his opinion in Vuitch.
226
Hoeber Notes, supra note 176, at XLII.
227
Id.
228
Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice William O. Douglas 6
(Dec. 30, 1971) (Brennan Papers, Box I-285, Folder 9).
229
Id. at 10.
230
Hoeber Notes, supra note 176, at XLIII.
231
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S 113, 210-11 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).
232
Id. at 213 (emphasis omitted).
233
Id. at 215. In an early draft, Justice Douglas referred to the propriety of
treating “the problem” as a medical one. Justice William O. Douglas, Seventh Draft
Opinion of Doe v. Bolton 15 (Jan. 1972) (Brennan Papers, Box I-286, Folder 1). He
later substituted “the procedure” for “the problem,” making the sentence oddly selfevident. Id. (handwritten emendation).
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The Douglas concurrence rambles through various
objections to the Georgia statute, but at the core of his
complaints was its restriction of the scope of the physician’s
decision-making authority. Although medical regulation by the
state was proper, the statute did not “give full sweep to the
‘psychological as well as physical well-being’” that the Court
established as the proper scope for consideration of the
Even more fundamentally,
woman’s health in Vuitch. 234
Douglas believed in a constitutive relationship between
medical care and privacy.
Douglas devoted Part III of his opinion to the medicineprivacy link. He framed the right of privacy as “the right to
care for one’s health and person and to seek out a physician of
one’s own choice.” 235 By allowing a committee of doctors not
selected by the patient to override the treating physician’s good
faith determination, the state caused “a total destruction of the
right of privacy between physician and patient and the
intimacy of relation which that entails.” 236 In terms no less
doctor-centered than Blackmun’s opinion for the Court,
Douglas declared that the “oversight imposed on the physician
and patient . . . denies them their ‘liberty,’ viz., their right of
privacy.” 237 In terms at least as bluntly reinforcing of medical
authority as Blackmun’s language for the majority, Justice
Douglas asserted recognition of the woman’s right of privacy
required that “the [state’s] control must be through the
physician of her choice.” 238
Douglas had been developing a right to health linked to
physicians’ expression rights since at least his dissenting
opinion in Poe v. Ullman, in which he wrote that “[t]he right of
the doctor to advise his patients according to his best lights
seems so obviously within First Amendment rights as to need
no extended discussion.” 239 He had initially drafted Griswold
also to encompass the physician’s role within the scope of the
First Amendment. A paragraph in an early draft, later

234

Roe, 410 U.S. at 215 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting United States v.
Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 72 (1971)).
235
Id. at 219.
236
Id.
237
Id. at 220 (emphasis added).
238
Id.
239
367 U.S. 497, 513 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
Connecticut statute prohibiting use of contraceptives was unconstitutional).
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dropped, asserted that “the family, together with its physician,
is an instructional unit as much as a school is.” 240
Justice Douglas retired from the Court in 1975, 241 and
his concurring opinion in Doe remains the fullest explication of
his hoped-for “right to health.” There is no way to know the
precise impact of his views about “control through the
physician” on Blackmun’s framing of the abortion right as one
jointly held by the doctor and the pregnant woman, but they
surely reinforced Blackmun’s inclinations in that direction, at a
minimum.
D.

The Triumph of Justice Brennan

More than any other member of the Court, Justice
Brennan shaped the creation of a right to privacy. Although
the seminal articulation of the concept originated in Justice
Harlan’s dissent in Poe, 242 its positive framing as a right
occurred in Griswold. Consistent with his focus on the First
Amendment, Justice Douglas originally drafted Griswold as
grounded primarily on the right to association. 243 As in the
abortion cases, he sent his first draft only to Justice Brennan,
who “suggest[ed] a substantial change in emphasis for your
Brennan argued against bringing the
consideration.” 244
husband-wife relationship within the First Amendment
association right because “[a]ny language to the effect that the
family unit is a sacred unit, that it is unreachable by the State
because it is an instruction unit, may come back to haunt us
just as Lochner did. . . . I would prefer a theory based on
privacy. . . .” 245
Wary of creating a precedent for protecting association
that any group could invoke to resist regulation, Brennan
suggested that the right of privacy was “more closely tailored to
the real interest at stake.” 246 Douglas accepted the suggestion.

240
Justice William O. Douglas, Draft Opinion of Griswold v. Connecticut 4
(May 1965) (Douglas Papers, Box 1347). The draft also referred to “an intimate
relation of husband and wife and their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.”
Id. at 3.
241
GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 111.
242
Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 522 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
243
Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice William O. Douglas 1-2
(Apr. 24, 1965) (Douglas Papers, Box 1347).
244
Id. at 1.
245
Id.
246
Id. at 2.
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A marked-up draft in his papers reveals that a key sentence in
the opinion—“[w]e deal with a right of privacy older than the
Bill of Rights”—originally read, “[w]e deal with a right of
association older than the Bill of Rights.” 247 When it was
announced, Griswold reverberated through the reproductive
rights advocacy community, leading lawyers in case after case
to reconfigure their arguments to place privacy concepts at the
center. 248
As described above, 249 Justice Brennan’s letter to
Douglas after the first arguments in Roe argued for a right that
was more grounded in the individual patient, 250 less tied to the
physician, 251 and less restrictive of the state’s role in promoting
quality of health care. 252 Like Blackmun, Brennan did not
frame his analysis in terms of equality rights for women, but
he sought a stronger and more unambiguous liberty right than
Blackmun did, and this more robust concept of liberty included
women. 253
Brennan pushed Blackmun in the same directions that
he pushed Douglas. In the first round of drafting, Brennan
called Blackmun to task for using vagueness as the basis for a
ruling in Roe, and then quickly joined a privacy-centered draft
After the second oral argument, Blackmun’s
for Doe. 254
November 1972 draft designated the first trimester as the cutoff point, beyond which state regulation was permissible. 255
Brennan, with Powell and Marshall, again lobbied Blackmun
for a new position.

247
Justice William O. Douglas, Draft Opinion of Griswold v. Connecticut 5
(Apr. 1965) (Douglas Papers, Box 1347).
248
GARROW, supra note 169, at 301-02, 304, 306, 307, 309-10, 312.
249
See supra text accompanying notes 227-30.
250
Basing a health approach on the right to privacy “identifies the right
squarely as that of the individual, not that of the individual together with his doctor.”
Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice William O. Douglas, supra note 228,
at 6.
251
The right of privacy “would seem to be broader than the right to consult
with, and act on the advice of, the physician of one’s choice.” Id.
252
“[T]he First Amendment approach may make it difficult to sustain
requirements for consultations with other doctors that should be upheld—as, for
instance, measures to restrain over-eagerness in performing novel operations for the
sake of research (or, worse, publicity) rather than for the sake of the patient’s health.”
Id. at 7.
253
Id. at 10.
254
See supra text accompanying notes 179, 183.
255
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra
note 190.
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Justice Marshall expressed concern that allowing
restrictions after the end of the first trimester would harm
women who had difficulty both believing they were pregnant
and deciding to have an abortion. 256 He suggested specifying
that state regulations were permissible after the first trimester
and before viability if “directed at health and safety alone.” 257
Brennan argued that the timing of regulation should track its
purpose, so that regulation designed to protect the woman’s
health could attach “at that point in time where abortions
become medically more complex” and regulation to protect fetal
life would apply after viability. 258 As obvious as it sounds,
Brennan’s point that viability was “a concept that focuses upon
the fetus rather than the woman” 259 not only helped to untangle
a difficult puzzle, but also drew a boundary that coincided
logically with a grounding in autonomy for the still developing
right of privacy.
E.

Justice Powell’s Eleventh-Hour Intervention

At the Justices’ conference following the second
argument, Justice Powell weighed in as “basically in accord”
with Blackmun. 260 Nonetheless, he urged that the Texas case
not be decided on vagueness grounds, but on the central merits
of the claims. Justice Powell also recommended that Roe be
made the lead case. Powell argued that “[a]bortion [is a]
medical problem broadly defined.” 261 Although until then
Blackmun had continued to believe that vagueness should form

256
Letter from Justice Thurgood Marshall to Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Dec.
12, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Fox 151, Folder 4).
257
Id.
258
Letter from Justice William J. Brennan to Justice Harry A. Blackmun 2-3
(Dec. 13, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 8).
259
Id. at 1.
260
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes 2 (Oct. 13, 1972)
(Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 9). Powell’s position apparently stemmed from his
experience when approached by a young lawyer at his Richmond firm. The associate’s
girlfriend had become pregnant, and he sought Powell’s advice and assistance
regarding an abortion. Oral History, supra note 3, at 200; JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR.,
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. 347 (2001).
261
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Notes, supra note 260, at 3. Powell also noted
his resistance to equal protection arguments on behalf of indigent women: “Do not like
economic questions unless related to health.” Id. This presaged his opinion upholding
restrictions on Medicaid funding of abortion coverage. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464
(1977).
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one basis for the opinion in Roe, 262 he now dropped it and
rearranged the opinions as Powell suggested, making Roe the
lead case, grounded on the privacy right.
Justice Powell was the first to question Blackmun’s
initial line-drawing at the end of the first trimester.
Blackmun’s November 27 draft had summarized the timing as
follows:
For the stage subsequent to the first trimester, the State may, if it
chooses, determine a point beyond which it restricts legal abortions
to stated reasonable therapeutic categories that are articulated with
sufficient clarity so that a physician is able to predict what
conditions fall within the stated classifications. 263

Powell wrote privately to Blackmun that drawing the line at
viability would be “more defensible in logic and biologically
Powell directed
than perhaps any other single time.” 264
Blackmun’s attention to the opinion in Abele v. Markle, 265 which
suggested that the state’s interest in fetal life would be
weightier after the fetus became capable of living outside the
uterus. 266 Blackmun requested feedback from the full Court, 267
which elicited the Marshall and Brennan correspondence
discussed above. 268
F.

The Opinion Blackmun Intended

When he retired, Justice Blackmun characterized the
abortion right as “a step that had to be taken as we go down
the road toward the full emancipation of women.” 269 Despite
this adoption of an equal liberty analysis that he did not share
at the time he wrote the opinion in Roe, 270 he also never
262
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Undated Notes 1 (“I wrote it before on
vagueness. I feel this still is sound and as a complement to [the] Georgia [case].”)
(Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 8).
263
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Draft Opinion of Roe v. Wade 48 (Nov. 21,
1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 6).
264
Letter from Justice Lewis F. Powell to Justice Harry A. Blackmun 1 (Nov.
29, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 4).
265
351 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn. 1972).
266
Id. at 232. At the conference following the second oral argument, Justice
Stewart had also suggested following this decision.
267
Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Dec. 11,
1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 4).
268
See supra text accompanying notes 256-59.
269
Oral History, supra note 3, at 206.
270
Blackmun acknowledged that he did not hold that view at the time that he
wrote Roe. “[A]s the furor developed and its integrity was attacked and upheld,
certainly I came to that conclusion, and I feel strongly about it today.” Id. Indeed, by
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abandoned his view that the physician’s guidance was
essential: “I think to this day there ought to be a physician’s
advice in there. I don’t believe in abortion on demand.” 271
Blackmun’s cry of misunderstanding—that he did not
favor “abortion on demand”—was sincere. Fundamentally,
Blackmun thought that he was writing an opinion that would
reform abortion law, largely by protecting reputable physicians
acting in good faith. Although the decisions in Roe and Doe
accomplished that, they also ended state power to compel the
completion of pregnancy based on absolutist notions of fetal life
or traditional precepts about sexual morality. As a result, in
cultural if not legal terms, to his own surprise and dismay,
Blackmun wrote the repeal of abortion law.
Perhaps the most important misunderstanding of the
Court’s opinions in Roe and Doe has been to treat them as
solely Justice Blackmun’s analysis. Blackmun repeatedly
stressed in the first years after the backlash began that he had
been writing for a seven-Justice majority, but as his allies on
the Court became less protective of Roe or were replaced by
Justices hostile to the decision, he more aggressively took up
the fight to protect it. 272 These later actions helped secure
identification of the abortion right as his legacy. In addition,
the simplistic explanation that his Mayo experience generated
a distorted emphasis on protecting physicians fueled the
perception that the medical reasoning in the abortion cases was
the idiosyncratic product of their author.
At every step in the consideration of Roe and Doe,
Blackmun sought an analysis that would resolve the cases on
narrower, rather than broader, grounds. He adhered to a
vagueness rationale in Roe until Justice Powell joined the
majority and called for a more substantive approach. 273 He

1989 even his notes to himself were impassioned. “To overthrow [Roe] would resemble
[here, Blackmun added as an emendation, “create”] the chaos created by Prohibition.
It will turn thousands of American women into criminals and their doctors too or it will
return us to the back alley. And a number of these women—an unconscionable
number—will die.” Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes on Webster v.
Reproductive Health Servs. 1 (Apr. 23, 1989) (Blackmun Papers, Box 536, Folder 2).
271
Oral History, supra note 3, at 206.
272
GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 138-45, 182-85, 198-206.
273
In sending his May 1972 draft of Roe to the other Justices, Blackmun said
that the vagueness theory “would be all that is necessary for disposition of the case,
and . . . we need not get into the more complex Ninth Amendment issue. . . . In any
event, I am still flexible as to results, and I shall do my best to arrive at something
which would command a court.” Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Harry
A. Blackmun (May 18, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 4).
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relinquished his initial tendency to support the Georgia law
and to preserve Vuitch-style statutes because he needed the
votes of Justices Brennan and Douglas to command a court. 274
He repeatedly advocated carrying the decision over until the
next term, 275 although Justice Douglas, especially, was livid
that Chief Justice Burger was attempting to change the
outcome through delay, by adding the votes of two new Nixon
appointees. 276 At that point, in the spring of 1972, Justice
Brennan was “prepared to lay three-to-one odds that Justice
Blackmun would eventually abandon the opinions he had
written” in the two abortion cases. 277 What comes across most
clearly in this history is Blackmun’s pragmatism, his
willingness to shift course on both vagueness and the
appropriate timing for restrictions, in order to keep a majority.
Blackmun repeatedly explained to his brethren that his
flexibility grew out of his efforts to attract sufficient support for
the opinion. 278
Against this backdrop, Blackmun’s research of medical
history and ethics appears more like caution vis-a-vis his more
gung-ho brethren than the construction of an illegitimate
rationale for a course that he was unwilling to question or
blindly determined to follow. The feedback that he received
from the other Justices about the incorporation of this research
into his opinion was uniformly positive, and it came not so
much from the more liberal Justices as from Powell, 279
Stewart, 280 and Rehnquist. 281
274

See supra text accompanying notes 169, 183, 256-59.
See supra text accompanying note 176.
276
GARROW, supra note 169, at 553-55.
277
Hoeber Notes, supra note 176, at LI.
278
See, e.g., Memorandum to the Conference from Justice Harry A. Blackmun,
supra note 273 (“I shall do my best to arrive at something which would command a
court.”); Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William H. Rehnquist (Nov.
27, 1972) [hereinafter Blackmun-Rehnquist Letter] (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder
4) (“My vagueness approach, however, did not find favor. . . . Thus, this time around,
I . . . did not reach the issue of vagueness.”); Blackmun-Powell letter, supra note 197, at
1 (“I could go along with viability if it could command a court.”).
279
“I am enthusiastic about your abortion opinions. They reflect impressive
scholarship and analysis, and I have no doubt that they will command a court.” Letter
from Justice Lewis F. Powell to Justice Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 264, at 1. On
the day that the abortion decisions were announced, Dottie Blackmun, the Justice’s
wife, attended the session. Powell had a handwritten note delivered to her which said,
“Dottie—Harry has written an historic opinion, which I was proud to join.” Justice
Lewis F. Powell, Handwritten Note to Dottie Blackmun (Jan. 22, 1973) (Blackmun
Papers, Box 151, Folder 3).
280
“I think your most recent circulations are even better than the original
ones, and I was again greatly impressed with the thoroughness and care with which
275
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There are also signs in the documents that Blackmun
was concerned about the proper role of state legislatures. His
private notes prior to the second conference include options for
smoothing the way for state legislatures to respond, including
possible withholding of the mandate until April 1, by which
time most would be in session. 282 He expected states to adopt
health-related requirements recommended by physicians for
the period after the first trimester:
I have the impression that many physicians are concerned about
facilities and, for example, the need of hospitalization, after the first
trimester. I would like to leave the states free to draw their own
medical conclusions with respect to the period after three months
and until viability. The states’ judgment of the health needs of the
mother, I feel, ought, on balance, to be honored. 283

He reassured Justice Rehnquist “that after the first trimester a
state is entitled to more latitude procedurally as well as
substantively.” 284
In short, Blackmun functioned as the broker of a
decision that combined the elaboration of privacy rights sought
by Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall with the insulation of
medical authority which Blackmun himself certainly favored
and which was also sought by Douglas, Powell, and Stewart. 285
Roe v. Wade has become synonymous with “activist” judging, as
contrasted to a jurisprudential ideal of incrementalism and

you have accomplished a very difficult job.” Letter from Justice Potter Stewart to
Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Dec. 27, 1972) (Blackmun Papers, Box 151, Folder 3).
281
“Although I am still in significant disagreement with parts of [your draft
opinions], I have to take my hat off to you for marshalling as well as I think could be
done the arguments on your side.” Letter from Justice William H. Rehnquist to Justice
Harry A. Blackmun, supra note 198. Rehnquist repeated this courtesy toward
Blackmun in his dissent. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 171 (1973) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
282
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Undated Handwritten Notes (Blackmun
Papers, Box 151, Folder 2). Blackmun also wanted the decisions to be announced by
mid-January “to tie in with the convening of most state legislatures.” Memorandum to
the Conference of from Justice Harry A. Blackmun (Dec. 15, 1972) (Blackmun Papers,
Box 151, Folder 4).
283
Blackmun-Powell Letter, supra note 197, at 1-2.
284
Blackmun-Rehnquist Letter, supra note 278.
285
During his oral history interview, Blackmun declined to elaborate on why
he grounded the analysis in substantive due process rather than another constitutional
provision. “The main thing, of course, was to try to get the Court together, because it
was in such a position of equivocacy among most of the justices.” Oral History, supra
note 3, at 201. David Garrow noted that “Blackmun’s colleagues appreciated that his
revisions had fully—and sometimes quite precisely—responded to their suggestions.”
GARROW, supra note 169, at 586.
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respect for the political branches. 286 How ironic it is that
searching for the narrowest ground for a decision was precisely
how Blackmun approached his task of writing the opinions in
Roe and Doe.
After Roe, Justice Blackmun smarted from criticism of
the opinion’s focus on the rights of doctors. 287 In the first
several years after Roe, Blackmun wanted to distance himself
from abortion and similar cases. In Carey v. Population
Services International, 288 involving minors’ access to
contraceptives, his letter commenting on Justice Brennan’s
draft of the opinion of the Court began by thanking Brennan
for “taking it on, for I have been too much in evidence in this
area in the past few years.” 289 Two terms later, in Beal v.
Franklin, 290 he wrote to himself, “More abortion and more
refinement of our theorizing . . . . I grow weary of these.” 291
The following year, in Bellotti v. Baird, 292 his notes on the case
reflect the same theme: “Abortion again and Massachusetts
again. . . . Perhaps they are tired, as I am, of all this fuss.” 293
IV.

REDEPLOYING MEDICAL RHETORIC

After Roe, the framing of medical authority in abortion
discourse fractured. Justice Blackmun embraced medicine
even more tightly, at least rhetorically, invoking its quality of
286
Two articles (out of many potential sources) illustrate the durability of the
criticism that Roe exceeded the bounds of proper judicial review: Richard A. Epstein,
Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973 SUP. CT. REV.
159, 168, 175, 180; Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term; Foreword:
Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4, 20 (1996).
287
WOODWARD & ARMSTRONG, supra note 8, at 415.
288
431 U.S. 678, 686-91, 700-02 (1977) (holding unconstitutional under the
First and Fourteenth Amendments a state law that criminalized the distribution of
contraceptives to minors, or to adults by persons other than pharmacists, and
prohibited any advertising or displaying of contraceptives).
289
Letter from Justice Harry A. Blackmun to Justice William J. Brennan
(Mar. 8, 1977) (Blackmun Papers, Box 240, File 3).
290
Beal v. Franklin, 428 U.S. 901 (1976) (vacating and remanding the case for
further consideration in light of Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52 (1976), Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106 (1976), and Virginia Board of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976)).
291
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Undated Handwritten Notes (Blackmun
Papers, Box 281, Folder 9).
292
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 651 (1979) (holding that a Massachusetts
law requiring a minor to obtain parental consent, or judicial approval after notification
to her parents, before seeking an abortion, was an unconstitutional burden on the
minor’s right to seek an abortion).
293
Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes on Belotti v. Baird (Feb.
25, 1979) (Blackmun Papers, Box 293, Folder 6).
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compassion as superior to what he saw as the meanspiritedness of fellow Justices who sought to overrule Roe.
Implicitly, this rhetoric also served as an indirect way for him
to describe himself in the same invidious terms. Anti-abortion
conservatives, by contrast, used a rhetoric of de-legitimating
medical authority as one path to undermining the logic of Roe.
A.

Blackmun’s Rhetorical Evolution

Blackmun’s life changed irrevocably with the issuance
of Roe v. Wade. He found himself, almost overnight, both
demonized and lionized. 294 As he came to accept his role as
chief defender of that decision, another side of medicine—its
qualities as a profession of mercy—came into sharper focus in
his philosophy. No documents indicate that this shift was
conscious, but the trend is clear. Blackmun reconfigured his
admiration of medicine, and deployed it rhetorically in a battle
over politically-charged attacks against reproductive rights. 295
Blackmun saw medicine not only as a source of
authority and expertise, but also as a model of compassion,
increasingly in a specifically political way. A recurring theme
in biographical accounts of Blackmun is the question of how a
small town Midwestern corporate lawyer turned judge became
a champion for the concerns of minorities and the less
powerful. 296 He became an impatient critic of those who sought
to undercut reproductive rights for women seeking care from
public facilities, to the point of chastising his fellow Justices for
their blindness to “another world ‘out there.’” 297

294
Oral History, supra note 3, at 204-05; GREENHOUSE, supra note 15, at 101,
134, 138, 182, 207.
295
See infra text accompanying notes 302-04, 309-12.
296
Pamela S. Karlan, Bringing Compassion into the Province of Judging:
Justice Blackmun and the Outsiders, 71 N.D. L. REV. 173, 173-75 (1995); Theodore W.
Ruger, Justice Harry Blackmun and the Phenomenon of Judicial Preference Change, 70
MO. L. REV. 1209, 1211-17 (2005); Note, The Changing Social Vision of Justice
Blackmun, 96 HARV. L. REV. 717 (1983); Jenkins, supra note 22.
297
Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438, 463 (1977). The phrase appears first in
Blackmun’s handwritten notes on the draft of an opinion in Danforth. Justice Harry A.
Blackmun, Third Draft of Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth 3 (June 6, 1976)
(Blackmun Papers, Box 220, Folder 9). Another indicator of the change in Blackmun’s
political views came in his notes during oral argument in Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S.
173 (1991). Kenneth Starr, then Solicitor General, represented the United States in
defending a statute that barred family planning funds to physicians who counseled
women about abortion, the so-called “gag rule.” “What a Boy Scout goodie-goodie,”
Blackmun wrote about Starr. Justice Harry A. Blackmun, Handwritten Notes on
Argument in Rust v. Sullivan (Oct. 30, 1990) (Blackmun Papers, Box 568, Folder 6).
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Part of the answer lies in his connection to medicine.
Medicine provided a model of professionalism for the public
good that Blackmun re-interpreted to encompass his changing
political understandings and sensibilities. His admiration for
medicine was a theme running through his entire professional
life, but after Roe he deployed its rhetoric for new purposes.
In reading his papers and speeches and the oral history,
one is struck by Blackmun’s admiration of what he saw as the
more robust notion of compassion in medicine than in law.
Blackmun believed that the key differences between law and
medicine lay in the adversarial approach to dispute resolution
characteristic of law as compared to the goal of service and
healing that dominated medicine. 298 The attribution of virtue
may have originated in idealization, but it seems to have
undergone a subtle evolution, such that it came to serve
another function. The quality of mercy that Blackmun located
in medicine but found often lacking in law provided a
benchmark and a justification for his own attempts, with fewer
allies among his fellow Justices as the years went on, to point
constitutional law in the same direction.
Blackmun’s association of medicine with humaneness
and not just skill began while he worked at Mayo. In a 1954
speech, he described the Mayo Clinic as “a place of
humanitarianism where the guiding principle is that of
responsibility to others.” 299 He cited numerous institutional
policies in support of that conclusion, such as never suing a
patient for a medical fee, declining payment if the money
resulted from the mortgaging of the patient’s home, providing
equal treatment to patients regardless of race or financial
status, and prioritizing the payment of salaries for the nursing
staff. 300 In 1958, on his personal copy of the American Medical
Association’s Principles of Ethics, Blackmun noted that the
ethical rule against disclosure of a patient’s confidences
contained an exception for when “it becomes necessary in order

298

See infra text accompanying notes 302-04, 309-12.
Harry A. Blackmun, Speech Notes 14 (Mar. 6, 1954) (Blackmun Papers,
Box 13, Folder 17).
300
Id. at 12-13; Labor Leaders Attack Tax Reform Proposal, Mar. 8, 1954
(publication unidentified; newspaper article describing meeting at which Blackmun
presented his speech) (Blackmun Papers, Box 13, Folder 17).
299
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to protect the welfare of the individual or of the community,”
which could be “more broad than the law itself.” 301
After Roe and the backlash that it triggered, one finds
Justice Blackmun not only lauding medicine, but also making
pointed comparisons between it and law. Speaking at the 1980
commencement of the Mayo Medical School, he extended
congratulations “as a member of the profession of
controversy. . . . to you, now members of the profession of
mercy.” 302 He repeated this point in his oral history interview
in 1994, stating that lawyers worked to resolve controversies,
while the goal of physicians was to work “for the common
goal . . . [of] cure . . . and alleviation of pain.” 303
In his 1995 speech at Mayo on pediatric issues, Justice
Blackmun described various categories of litigation affecting
children, concluding with the advice that physicians should
“rely on your good medical judgment rather than place too
heavy a burden on what might be regarded as established
law.” 304 Specifically as to abused children, he cited DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Social Services Department, 305 holding that
a brutally battered child had no right to relief based on the
state’s failure to protect him after being notified of his father’s
previous assaults. 306 Blackmun noted that “[i]t is the case
where, in solitary dissent, I spoke of ‘Poor Joshua.’” 307
A 1994 speech focused on law and psychiatry seems
particularly revealing. Blackmun spoke on the occasion of
having received the Isaac Ray Lectureship Award from the
American Psychiatric Association. He began by describing
Ray, one of the Association’s founders, in these terms:
Dr. Ray stressed human kindness. He believed that a psychiatrist
must minister to all . . . not just to the patient and must endeavor to
soften the ever-present human prejudice and cruelty toward the
incompetent. So we have in Dr. Ray an example of . . . an individual
who dared to inquire and to investigate the law insofar as it affected
his patients directly or indirectly and an individual who would

301
Copy of Principles of Medical Ethics, J. AM. MED. ASS’N, June 7, 1958,
marked by Blackmun with his initials and a handwritten notation, “Mr. Blackmun’s
personal copy” (on file with author).
302
Blackmun, Remarks at Commencement, supra note 44, at 575.
303
Oral History, supra note 3, at 13.
304
Mayo Clinic Pediatric Days Speech, supra note 99, at 11.
305
489 U.S. 189 (1989).
306
Id. at 191.
307
Mayo Clinic Pediatric Days Speech, supra, note 99, at 7.
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improve the lot of some of the least respected among us. That,
indeed, is an example of magnitude of character and of endeavor. 308

In conclusion, Blackmun returned to this theme, describing
psychiatrists as “an important part of the profession—indeed,
of the ministry—of healing, which demands kindness,
understanding, and sympathy.” 309 He contrasted that with
“[t]he current federal judiciary,” which he described as
“tak[ing] a tough, narrow view of the defenses based on
competence.” 310
Blackmun referred specifically to Godinez v. Moran, in
which he had dissented, and in which the Court set the
standard for assessing competence for a guilty plea or waiver of
counsel at the same relatively low level as that for standing
trial: whether the individual could consult with a lawyer with a
“Can the
reasonable degree of rational understanding. 311
recent Godinez decision,” he asked rhetorically, “possibly be
correct in the eyes of the practicing psychiatrist or, if I may be
so bold, in the eyes of Isaac Ray?” 312
B.

The Backlash

In the years after Roe, as more conservative Justices
joined the Court, the Court shifted to a more restrictive
approach to abortion rights. In doing so, it used a counterrhetoric of the unreliability of medical judgment as a primary
discursive mechanism.
One example of how the Court constructed medical
rhetoric in precisely the opposite way from what Blackmun was
attempting is the application of abortion law to minors. In one
of its first post-Roe abortion decisions, the Court held that laws
requiring parental consent before a minor could obtain an
abortion were unconstitutional as applied to mature minors or
to minors for whom an abortion would be in their best
interests. 313 This initial decision left the determination of the
minor’s best interests, as well as the assessment of medical
maturity, that is, whether an adolescent was sufficiently
mature to consent to a medical procedure, up to physicians.
308
309
310
311
312
313

Isaac Ray Lecture, supra note 63, at 800.
Id. at 804.
Id.
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398 (1993).
Isaac Ray Lecture, supra note 63, at 804.
Planned Parenthood of Cent. Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
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But the Court later changed course, and upheld state statutes
which created a requirement that judges, not doctors,
determine a minor’s best interests or maturity. 314 On this
issue, the Court insisted on evidentiary hearings rather than
deference to doctors, despite substantial record evidence that
the hearings were of little value. 315
Similarly, post-Roe anti-abortion laws such as the one
challenged in City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health 316 frequently included a provision specifying a script
that a doctor had to recite to the patient when obtaining her
informed consent, much of it a thinly disguised polemic
designed to persuade the woman to reconsider her decision to
abort. 317 The Court found that such a requirement constituted
an “intrusion upon the discretion of the pregnant woman’s
physician.” 318 Nine years later, however, the Court reversed
Akron’s holding on informed consent in Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey. 319
The tone of the Court’s opinions continued to change,
with increasing frequency, to skepticism about the professional
reliability of physicians who performed abortions. Justice
Blackmun’s invocation of medical authority moved to the
dissent. 320 Eight years after Casey, the debate within the Court
centered on whether the majority’s analysis in that case was a
throwback to a “repudiated” model of deference to physicians. 321
314
Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622 (1979). The Court cited Justice Stewart’s
concurring opinion in Danforth, which signaled the beginnings of skepticism as to
medical deference: “It seems unlikely that [the pregnant teenager] will obtain adequate
counsel and support from the attending physician at an abortion clinic.” Id. at 641
(citing 428 U.S. at 91). The Court has reaffirmed its commitment to permitting a
bypass of parental consent (and additionally notification) only by the judiciary.
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417 (1990); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981).
315
Hodgson v. Minnesota, 648 F. Supp. 756, 766-67, 775 (D. Minn. 1986),
rev’d, 497 U.S. 417 (1990).
316
462 U.S. 416 (1983).
317
Id. at 423 n.5.
318
Id. at 445.
319
505 U.S. 833, 884 (1992) (joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter,
JJ.).
320
See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 218 (1991) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“In our society, the doctor-patient dialogue embodies a unique relationship
of trust. The specialized nature of medical science and the emotional distress often
attendant to health-related decisions requires that patients place their complete
confidence, and often their very lives, in the hands of medical professionals.”).
321
Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 968-69 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
Justice Kennedy’s dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, argued at length that the
Court had ceded too much authority to physician judgment, in what he asserted was a
misinterpretation of the more relaxed standard for review of state statutes established
in Casey. Id. at 965-70.
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Even the vocabulary grew sharper. Justices hostile to
Roe began to include “abortionist” in their opinions and to deemphasize the more respectful terms “physician” and “doctor.”
Justice White used the word “abortionist” seven times in his
dissenting opinion in Colautti v. Franklin. 322 Justice Blackmun
noticed it in White’s draft, and commented in the margin, “the
hateful word.” 323 In Stenberg v. Carhart, three Justices who
filed dissenting opinions used the word “abortionist[s]” thirteen
times in their two opinions. 324
V.

THE MYTH OF MEDICAL INDEPENDENCE

Considering the specifics of Harry Blackmun’s life,
together with the broader dynamics of how the Supreme Court
adjudicated the abortion cases, provides us one view of a
fascinating and portentous constitutional debate. Consistent
with the overarching theme of this article, one can also analyze
it in the context of the relationship between the judiciary and
medicine. In that frame, the same story operates as a
particularly powerful episode in the social negotiation of the
role of medicine as a disciplinary discourse.
Roe privileged medical authority, but not in the
conventional sense of deference to expertise. What the Court
sought to protect as the province of medicine was neither
technical nor scientific. The abortion decisions cleared for
physicians a sufficiently expansive legal and cultural space to
insulate them as they resolved, patient by patient, the clash of
incommensurate social values.
The Court in essence delegated juridical authority to
physicians. What constituted a therapeutic abortion in the
regime of first Vuitch and then Roe and Doe could not be
derived solely from law and certainly not solely from science.
The Court’s decisions revealed “therapeutic” as a social
construct, a category with no enforceable meaning. To satisfy
therapeutic criteria under the new rules, medical indicators for
abortion could include a range of life situations. Regulation
was replaced by diagnosis, which was itself regulation.
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Underlying this discursive move was the assumption
that medicine constitutes a private realm apart from the state
which can therefore function as a buffer between the individual
and the state. In Douglas’ mind as well as Blackmun’s,
medicine helped to define what was private, with doctors
serving as border patrols. Douglas was less enamored of the
profession than Blackmun, but his libertarianism could align
with his concept of medical care as a core aspect of privacy only
if and when he believed that physicians operated
independently of the state. Both had an unspoken faith in
medicine as a parallel and independent universe of power.
Physicians did legitimately present themselves as
victims of an over-reaching state because usually only they
(and not the women seeking abortions) were the actors at risk
of prosecution. 325 The Justices could easily see doctors as
targets of state power. What the Court did not see, or at least
acknowledge, was the role of physicians as partners in
regulation and the power of medicine as social discipline.
Whether seen or not, however, the import of the early abortion
cases was to entrust physicians with even more regulatory
authority than they had previously exercised, by seeming to
remove the fear of hostile surveillance by the state. 326
Delegation to doctors of questions associated with the
repercussions of sexual misconduct also resonated with a
powerful construct of public-private divide. In a context of
adjudicating issues of morality, the law/medicine framework
aligned with the public/private dichotomy. The second realm in
each dichotomy dealt with family and familial concerns, in
ways that could shield the first realm from the messiness of
competing moral arguments.
Reassuringly, both halves
operated under male supervision.
The Court’s delegation of power ultimately failed,
however, because it occurred at the precise moment when the
authority of medicine was itself under challenge. The same
discourse of rights against which medical authority was
thought to provide a sensible counterweight had invaded
medicine itself, and the weight of professional opinion tipped to
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support for the right of the pregnant woman to decide whether
to have an abortion just as the early cases were heading toward
the Supreme Court. 327 The social control that Blackmun and
others on the Court anticipated did not prevail. This broader
change is why the opinions in Roe and Doe said reform, but did
repeal.
As the post-Roe abortion story unfolded, an increasingly
conservative Court realized that physicians as a class could not
be trusted to police the border defining the allowable degree of
state intrusion into sexual and moral decision-making. The
doctor-patient relationship created a sequestered space which
enabled resistance to and non-compliance with traditional
norms. The Court sought to retrieve aspects of the power
which it had delegated, by reinstating the state as ultimate
authority.
Today, the many and continuing battles over abortion
show us that medical authority can be deployed to enhance the
power of the state and not just of the profession. What the
Court did in Roe—with whatever degree of consciousness—was
command and de-control. Roe’s invalidation of all extant
abortion laws delegated responsibility to another center of
power, at least as much as it protected the medical profession.
When a critical mass of judges later found medicine to be
institutionally unreliable in enforcing social norms, the Court
retracted its deference. The expansion and contraction of
deference to medicine in the abortion cases has been an
epiphenomenon of ideological shifts.
The irony, especially for a classic liberal believer in
public and private realms such as Blackmun, was that the 1973
Court’s belief in medical authority as apolitical catalyzed the
most massive politicization of medicine in American history.
Abortion both revealed the extent to which medicine’s apolitical
status was mythic and drove the Court’s own ever deeper
politicization, reaching the level of partisan campaigns and
litmus tests for judicial appointments.
Blackmun crafted a resolution in Roe and Doe that
sidestepped one crisis of authority, over the intrusion of public
power into intimate life, but exacerbated another, the crisis of
the judiciary’s role in a democratic republic. Medicine failed
him and the Court as a mechanism of civic governance.
Instead, abortion revealed medicine as a discursive system
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whose meaning, like that of the law, was contingent on
structures of power that it could not control.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Justice Blackmun bears ultimate responsibility for the
decisions that he wrote and whatever shortcomings they
contained regardless of the pressures which he experienced.
But the glib attribution of Roe’s reasoning to his decade at the
Mayo Clinic is unfounded. The conventional view of Blackmun
as a naïve defender of doctors is itself naïve and grossly
inadequate to explain the medicalized framing of Roe and Doe.
This is not to deny that Roe was in part the product of a
society-wide renegotiation of the role of medical authority. The
Court sought to entrust medicine with decisions which required
normative rather than scientific judgments, under a mask of
professional expertise. Ultimately, the medical framing could
not withstand political challenges from feminists on one side
and moral conservatives on the other. Medicine was central,
but it could not suffice as a civic or cultural center. It was a
center that did not hold.

